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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines the forces driving the adoption of an accounting practice, stock 
option expensing (SOE), among the Fortune 500 in the wake of the recent corporate 
scandals. I argue that in the ensuing debates and challenges to the legitimacy of 
existing institutional frameworks governing corporate behavior, SOE became a 
symbol of normative legitimacy and a way for organizations to defend against threats 
to their own legitimacy. In analyzing the effects of different types of legitimacy 
threats, the results indicate that organizations in industries that were under intensive 
levels of investigation were more likely to adopt SOE, but that negative media 
scrutiny and shareholder activism did not influence SOE adoption. The results also 
suggest that as the Financial Accounting Standards Board threatened to require SOE, 
the significance of the practice as a symbol of normative legitimacy began to diminish. 
The findings broaden and deepen our understanding of how organizations engage in 
symbolic practice adoption to defend their legitimacy as well as the processes shaping 
the social construction of accounting practices. This paper also provides empirical 
support for recent theoretical claims regarding legitimacy defense and expands upon 
recent work that has made links between the impression management literature and 
neoinstitutional theory.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The concept of organizational legitimacy has been central to institutional and 
ecological approaches in organizational theory. An impressive body of research has 
examined how organizations seek to acquire and maintain not only material resources, 
but seek to become legitimate to various constituents by bringing their structures, 
procedures, policies, and goals in line with legal rules and regulations, field-level 
norms, and taken-for-granted cultural constructs. Organizational scholars have 
theorized the process of organizational legitimation as both a passive adherence to 
existing rules and norms (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, Meyer and Rowan 1977), as 
well as an active process that organizational actors engage and manage (Pfeffer and 
Salancik 1978, Ashforth and Gibbs 1990). Research on the active management of 
organizational legitimacy, however, has traditionally focused on how organizations 
acquire legitimacy in their early development stages, rather than how organizations 
maintain and defend their legitimacy once it has been established.  
  This paper examines how organizations attempted to defend their legitimacy in 
the wake of the recent scandals at Enron and other companies. Instead of focusing on 
impression management techniques, however, this paper focuses on how organizations 
which were experiencing challenges to their legitimacy adopted an accounting practice 
that became infused with symbolic meaning in the post-Enron environment: stock 
option expensing (SOE). By adopting this practice, an organization calculates the cost 
of the stock options it has granted to employees and includes this item in its income 
statement, thus reducing earnings and earning per share. In the intense public debates 
following the collapse of Enron, stock options became a target of extensive criticism 
as a compensation mechanism that created powerful incentives for executives to2 
 
 
 manipulate financial statements in order to boost short-term earnings. In addition, 
since companies were not required to formally recognize a compensation expense for 
stock options on their financial statements, their accounting treatment was viewed as 
fraudulent. Consequently, voluntary stock option expensing became a way in which 
organizations could signal their legitimacy within the normative environment that 
emerged after Enron, an environment that placed renewed emphasis on financial 
transparency and restraining executive compensation.  
Between July 2002 and July 2004, 753 publicly traded companies in the United 
States voluntarily decided to adopt SOE, even though the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (FASB) had adopted formal rules defining SOE at the end of 1995. 
Prior to July 2002, only 13 publicly traded companies had adopted SOE. The financial 
economics literature (Aboody et al. 2003, Deshmukh et al. 2004, Seethamraju and 
Zach 2004) has emphasized firm-level financial considerations as well as the 
individual financial incentives of managers as primary drivers of SOE adoption. 
Although this literature acknowledges the connection between SOE adoption and the 
scandals, it focuses on the ways in which the scandals altered the economic costs and 
benefits of adoption, and eschews a deeper analysis of the complex connections 
between the political pressures for corporate reform that were set in motion by the 
corporate scandals and patterns of SOE adoption.  
  In contrast to economic approaches, this paper expands upon the work of 
Mezias (1990, 1995), Carruthers (1995), and Hatherly et al. (2005), which has 
demonstrated that our understanding of the adoption and use of accounting practices 
can be greatly enhanced by sociological analysis and, more specifically, institutional 
organizational theory. The adoption of SOE during this time period provides an 
interesting research site for examining how practice adoption is connected to 
organizational legitimacy challenges and for assessing the relative power of different 3 
 
 
institutional forces in challenging organizational legitimacy, such as regulatory 
agencies, the media, and shareholders. This paper expands upon recent theoretical 
work on the management of organizational legitimacy (Ashforth and Gibbs 1990, 
Suchman 1995) and recent attempts to combine institutional theory with perspectives 
on impression management (Elsbach 1994, Elsbach and Sutton 1992). In addition, this 
paper extends the core tenet of institutional organizational theory that organizations 
symbolically adopt practices to gain legitimacy (Meyer and Rowan 1977) by 
highlighting the possibility that organizations engage in symbolic practice adoption to 
defend legitimacy. Finally, this paper challenges economic interpretations of 
accounting practice adoption.    
  This paper will begin with a brief review of the literature on the defense of 
organizational legitimacy, highlighting the gaps in the research on practice adoption as 
a strategy for legitimacy defense. I will then provide a detailed examination of the 
broader social and political context in which SOE adoption occurred and how SOE 
acquired symbolic meaning in the post-Enron environment. My primary argument is 
that the Enron scandal and the ensuing debates about corporate reform challenged the 
legitimacy of specific organizations, as well as the legitimacy of prevailing norms of 
corporate governance, corporate reporting, the power and compensation of executives, 
and the role of regulatory institutions. In this period of institutional destabilization, 
stock option expensing emerged as a symbol of normative legitimacy because it 
signaled that an organization was adhering to a new set of norms that valued financial 
transparency and curbs on excessive executive compensation. Given this symbolic 
meaning, I argue that organizations that were experiencing a threat to their legitimacy 
were more likely to adopt the practice as a way to defend their legitimacy. The paper 
then develops and tests hypotheses about which organizations were more likely to 
adopt: those under investigation or in an industry with a high level of investigation, 4 
 
 
those that were the subject of intensive media scrutiny relating to investigations or 
malfeasance, and those that were the target of shareholder activism.  
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CHAPTER 2 
DEFENDING ORGANIZATIONAL LEGITIMACY 
 
The concept of organizational legitimacy has been central to organizational sociology. 
For population ecologists, the legitimacy of organizations and organizational forms 
has been fundamental to analyzing the growth and decline of organizational 
populations over time (Carroll and Hannan 2000, Hannan and Freeman 1992). 
Population ecology has for the most part neglected analyses of the mechanisms 
through which legitimacy is socially constructed, in favor of using legitimacy as a 
variable in analyzing broader historical processes at the macro level. Institutional 
theory, however, has devoted a great deal of energy to analyzing the social 
construction of the legitimacy of organizations, organizational practices, and 
organizational populations at multiple levels (Barron et al., 1986, Baum and Powell 
1995, DiMaggio and Powell 1983, Meyer and Rowan 1977, Scott 2001). Although the 
meaning of organizational legitimacy is often itself taken for granted, theoretical 
definitions and typologies of organizational legitimacy have much in common.  
Suchman (1995: 574) provides a concise but expansive definition of 
organizational legitimacy as “a generalized perception or assumption that the actions 
of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed 
system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions.” Suchman (1995) further specifies 
this general definition by identifying three forms of organizational legitimacy: 
pragmatic, moral, and cognitive. Pragmatic legitimacy is “support for an 
organizational policy based on that policy’s expected value to a set of constituents” 
(1995: 574), while moral legitimacy is based on whether organizational actions are 
perceived as “the right thing to do … by the audience’s socially constructed value 
system” (1995: 579). Finally, cognitive legitimacy is not based on “interest or 
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evaluation” but “acceptance of the organization as necessary based on some taken-for-
granted cultural account.”(1995: 582). Both Aldrich (2001) and Ruef and Scott (1998) 
invoke Suchman’s broad definition of organizational legitimacy, but make slight 
modifications to his more detailed typology. Aldrich  (2001: 230) modifies Suchman’s 
scheme to define two primary forms of organizational legitimacy: cognitive, which 
refers to a taken-for-granted status, and socio-political, which “refers to the acceptance 
by key stakeholders, the general public, key opinions, and government officials” that 
an organization, organizational feature, or organizational practice “is appropriate and 
right.” For Aldrich (2001: 230), sociopolitical legitimacy can be further broken down 
into moral acceptance, or “conformity with cultural norms and values,” and regulatory 
acceptance, or “conformity with government rules and regulations.”  The cognitive, 
moral, and regulatory legitimacy of Aldrich’s typology corresponds directly with 
Scott’s (2001) well-known three part typology of cognitive, normative, and regulative 
legitimacy. 
  At the risk of glossing over deeper ontological differences, there appears to be 
broad agreement that organizational legitimacy is a socially constructed, taken-for-
granted status of an organization and its activities as appropriate within broad, 
culturally-defined norms of appropriateness (taken for granted and not), more 
proximate field-level norms of appropriateness, as well as formal legal rules that exist 
at multiple levels. In addition, the existing literature has demonstrated that 
organizational legitimacy can emerge through an uncontested process of alignment of 
an organization and its activities within existing sets of laws and norms (DiMaggio 
and Powell 1983). However, organizational legitimacy also emerges out of a more 
complex set of social processes in which organizations seek to acquire and maintain 
legitimacy; constituents, stakeholders, and other groups of actors define and confer 
legitimacy; and different groups conflict over how legitimacy is defined and conferred  
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(Hirsch 1995). Hence, the social construction of organizational legitimacy is both an 
active and passive process between organizational actors, field-level actors, and 
broader society.  
  Suchman (1995) has drawn another distinction between strategic approaches to 
the study of legitimacy, which have emphasized the active intervention of 
organizational actors in managing organizational legitimacy, and institutional 
approaches, which have taken a broader perspective on the gradual ways in which 
organizations attain and maintain legitimacy by becoming isomorphic with their 
broader field and societal environments over long periods of time. Acknowledging 
Suchman’s (1995) insight that both approaches are useful for identifying coexisting 
processes in real organizations, this paper focuses on strategic action that 
organizations take when their legitimacy is under some type of threat or challenge, but 
places these actions within a broader institutional perspective by paying close attention 
to the field and societal level dynamics in which this strategic action occurred. As I 
will show, the strategic action of SOE adoption by organizations took place within a 
broader context in which norms regarding accounting practices, corporate governance, 
and executive compensation were being challenged and redefined by a diverse group 
of actors.  
  My choice to focus on the strategic management of organizational legitimacy 
is not based on a view of legitimacy as primarily instrumental in nature. Organizations 
do engage in instrumental action to acquire, maintain, and defend their legitimacy by 
structuring their organizations in certain ways and adopting particular practices. 
However, such action is embedded within a network of other actors who confer 
legitimacy, such as the state, labor and employee groups, professions, investors, 
competitors, suppliers, and other stakeholders, all of whom have specific interests in 
defining which organizations and which actions are legitimate. In addition,  
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instrumental action relating to the management of organizational legitimacy is shaped 
by a broader set of societal and cultural processes that define and legitimize formal 
rules, norms, and ideologies. In this paper, I examine a period in which these broader 
processes were particularly visible as the normative expectations and the legitimacy of 
systems of accounting, corporate governance, and executive compensation and power 
were being challenged and redefined. The same forces also generated a number of 
challenges to the legitimacy of particular organizations involved with or seen as 
connected to the scandals. More specifically, I will examine how, within this 
environment, certain organizations used symbols of the emerging normative order to 
manage their own legitimacy, or more specifically, to defend their legitimacy. My 
choice to focus on the relatively instrumental act of legitimacy defense does not 
represent a view of this as the most important facet of the myriad processes 
surrounding the social construction of organizational legitimacy. It is merely one part 
of a much larger picture, but one that was particularly visible and interesting after the 
collapse of Enron.  
  The empirical literature on the strategic management of organizational 
legitimacy has focused primarily on how organizations acquire and maintain 
legitimacy, rather than how organizations defend their legitimacy (Suchman 1995, 
Ashforth and Gibbs 1990). In reviewing the literature on legitimacy management, 
Suchman (1995) claims that when organizational legitimacy comes under attack, the 
focal organization will engage in specific actions to repair legitimacy.
1 A common 
action is the creation of a normalizing account that “separates the threatening 
revelation from larger assessments of the organization as a whole.” (Suchman 1995: 
597). Another strategy is strategic restructuring in which an organization makes 
specific changes to practices, procedures, or structures that are associated with the 
                                                 
1 I treat legitimacy defense and legitimacy repair as conceptually the same process.   
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legitimacy challenge. As Suchman (1995: 598) explains, an effective strategy for 
legitimacy repair is to make “narrowly tailored changes that mesh with equally 
focused normalizing accounts,” rather than “indiscriminate structural shifts that may 
make the organizational appear unstable.” In a similar theoretical approach, Ashforth 
and Gibbs (1988: 180) contend that organizations use both substantive changes to 
organizational goals and practices, as well as symbolic adoption “to appear consistent 
with social values and expectations.” The latter includes both rhetorical strategies and 
the ceremonial adoption of practices along the lines first sketched out by Meyer and 
Rowan (1977). When organizations have to defend legitimacy, they are more likely to 
use symbolic activities rather than “real, material change in organizational goals, 
structures, and processes” (Ashforth and Gibbs 1988: 183) because it is more difficult 
for an organization to respond with immediate and substantial structural changes that 
are viewed without skepticism by constituents.  
  The existing theoretical literature on the defense and repair of organizational 
legitimacy, therefore, has claimed that in the face of legitimacy challenges, 
organizations will rely to a large extent on symbolic activities, including both 
rhetorical strategies and restructuring. However, empirical research on legitimacy 
defense (e.g., Elsbach 1994, Elsbach and Sutton 1998, Marcus and Goodman 1991, 
Metzler 2001, Sutton and Callahan 1987) has focused primarily on impression 
management techniques, i.e., the different types of rhetorical devices that 
organizations use in response to a crisis, whether these are media or advertising 
campaigns, press releases, press conferences, or other public statements (for an 
exception, see Westphal and Zajac, 1994). Some of these studies have examined the 
connection between rhetorical strategies and existing. legitimate organizational 
structures. For example, in examining the success of different rhetorical strategies in 
protecting organizational legitimacy in the face of controversial events, Elsbach  
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(1994) found that the most successful accounts were those that both acknowledged (as 
opposed to denied) a problem and referred to an organization’s institutionalized 
characteristics (as opposed to its technical characteristics). Also, Elsbach and Sutton 
(1998) found that social movement organizations engaging in controversial protest 
activities still acquired legitimacy by decoupling these activities from other 
institutionalized and legitimate practices, in conjunction with impression management 
strategies that highlighted these practices.  
  Hence, the empirical research on legitimacy defense has started to examine 
how rhetorical strategies relate to existing, legitimate organizational practices, but we 
still know very little about how organizations use symbolic practice adoption in 
defending their legitimacy. More specifically, we know little about what types of 
threats will generate symbolic practice adoption as a response, what types of 
organizations in what types of situations will use symbolic practice adoption, what 
types of practices organizations will use, and how field-level dynamics shape 
legitimacy challenges and organizational responses to them. The analysis presented in 
this paper is an effort to begin filling this gap by examining a situation in which a 
group of organizations adopted an accounting practice as a way to defend their 
legitimacy.  
  In addition, the literature on the defense of organizational legitimacy, and 
legitimacy management in general, has not incorporated the more sophisticated 
typologies of organizational legitimacy that have been developed (Aldrich 2001, Ruef 
and Scott 1998, Suchman 1995). For example, do organizations react to challenges to 
their normative legitimacy differently from how they react to challenges to their 
regulative or cognitive legitimacy? If so, how and why? I do not develop a 
comprehensive theoretical incorporation of these typologies in this paper, but, 
recognizing the challenge posed by Ruef and Scott (1998) to move beyond “vague,  
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general assertions about organizations being legitimated by societal values,” I will 
specify the types of legitimacy that were challenged and the type of legitimacy that 
SOE seemed to confer. This represents an attempt to take seriously how different 
forms of legitimacy can be challenged and how these challenges influence both active 
legitimacy management strategies and more gradual processes of isomorphism within 
organizational fields.  
  The scandals at Enron and other companies generated different types of 
legitimacy challenges. First, the scandals challenged the regulative, normative, and 
cognitive legitimacy of existing systems of accounting, auditing procedures, corporate 
governance, and executive compensation. Second, the scandals challenged the 
regulative and normative legitimacy of specific organizations involved in behavior 
that was perceived as either illegal or not in alignment with prevailing norms and 
beliefs, or organizations connected to such behavior. These legitimacy challenges 
emanated from direct investigations by a variety of regulatory agencies, media 
scrutiny of company activities and allegations of malfeasance, successful and 
unsuccessful attempts at the creation of new laws and regulations, extensive debates in 
the media about broader consequences and solutions, and a resurgence of shareholder 
activism. This paper will examine one way in which organizations addressed 
challenges to their legitimacy: by adopting the accounting practice of stock option 
expensing. SOE became a symbolic way that companies could demonstrate their 
legitimacy within a shifting normative landscape and hence was a particularly useful 
way for organizations to deal with challenges to their own normative and regulative 
legitimacy. This paper will, therefore, attempt to provide empirical support for 
Suchman’s and Ashford and Gibbs’ claims that organizations engage in symbolic 
restructuring when defending legitimacy.   
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  To gain a better sense of how SOE acquired symbolic meaning in the wake of 
the scandals, I will now turn to a more detailed examination of first, the contentious 
history of stock options accounting, and second, the investigations and broader debates 
about corporate reform that emerged in 2002.  
  
  13
CHAPTER 3 
THE LANDSCAPE OF STOCK OPTION ACCOUNTING  
 
The accounting treatment of employee stock options has been the focus of periodic 
conflict between corporate managers, the accounting profession, regulators, 
legislators, and the investment community. These controversies have centered on 
whether it is possible to accurately value a stock option at the time it is given to an 
employee and whether companies should account for stock options formally as a 
compensation expense in their financial statements. This section provides a brief 
overview of the history of stock option accounting and the most recent period of 
controversy that began in the wake of the Enron scandal.  
  A stock option is a contract that gives an employee the right to purchase a 
fixed number of shares at a fixed price for a fixed period of time. Employees gradually 
receive the right to exercise (or purchase) these shares through a process known as 
vesting, which is usually linked to continued employment. Once employees are vested 
in their options, they can exercise their options at any time. The advantage for the 
employee is that if the company’s stock price rises, the employee can exercise the 
option, purchase the stock at the contractual price, and then sell it at the higher market 
price. Unlike publicly traded stock options, employee stock options can not be 
purchased or sold, only exercised by the employee or allowed to expire. 
  Since the 1920s, a diverse group of companies have used stock options as a 
form of compensation for employees. Stock options have historically been used as an 
executive benefit and surged in popularity as a form of executive compensation in the 
1980s. The primary corporate rationale for granting stock options to executives has 
been that options help to mitigate the principal-agent problem by linking the interests 
of management with those of shareholders. Executive stock options have been the14 
 
 subject of much criticism as one of the primary forces driving the astronomical 
increase in executive compensation since the 1980s (Lowenstein 2004). The granting 
of stock options, however, has not been restricted to executives. As far back as the 
1950s, many high-tech companies, particularly in Silicon Valley, have granted stock 
options to a majority or all of their nonmanagement employees (Blasi et al. 2003). 
Stock options have been a way that these companies have attempted to attract, retain, 
and motivate knowledge workers, such as software programmers and engineers, who 
represent some of the core assets of these organizations. Stock options also allow 
startups to save cash for other capital investments rather than compensation. In the 
1980s and 1990s, new industries around software development and the Internet 
emerged. Due to tight labor markets and a more intense dependency on knowledge 
capital, these companies granted stock options to employees beyond a select group of 
knowledge workers (Blasi et al. 2003). By the mid 1990s, broad-based stock option 
plans (BBSOPs) had become institutionalized as a standard practice within most high-
tech industries, in Silicon Valley and elsewhere. At this time, the practice also spread 
in a more limited fashion to nontechnology companies.  
  Another reason why stock options became a popular form of compensation for 
executives and other employees is their favorable accounting treatment. Historically, 
companies have not been required to account for employee stock options granted as a 
compensation expense. This makes stock options unique among all forms of cash or 
equity-based compensation. In the mid-1980s, the regulatory agency that establishes 
and maintains accounting standards, the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB), began to review the accounting treatment of stock options. In 1992, FASB 
announced that it wished to require companies to formally recognize the value of stock 
options as an expense in their financial statements, as calculated by an option pricing 
model that had been originally developed for publicly traded stock options. FASB’s 15 
 
rationale was that options do have value when they are granted as compensation, both 
to the employee and to the company, and that accounting for them as an expense adds 
to the transparency of financial statements.  
  As part of its process of setting accounting standards, FASB allows for a 
public comment period on rules that it proposes. FASB faced stiff opposition to its 
proposed regulations, primarily from technology companies, but also from some 
shareholder groups and legislators inside the Beltway. Due to the powerful lobbying 
capacity of large technology companies, who have relied heavily on stock options as a 
form of compensation not only for top management but for broad groups of 
employees, FASB backed down from its initial proposal (Levitt  2002). In 1995, 
FASB released Financial Accounting Statement 123 (FAS 123), which represented a 
compromise between FASB and the opponents of expensing. FAS 123 recommended 
that firms formally show an expense on their financial statements for employee stock 
options, but did not require them to do so. However, FAS 123 stipulated that if a firm 
did not expense their options, it was required to reveal in a footnote to its financial 
statements what the impact of such an expense would have been on earnings and 
earning per share. Stock option accounting reform was considered to be complete with 
the compromise embodied in FAS 123. Between the adoption of FAS 123 and July 
2002, only 13 companies chose to formally expense their stock options under the rules 
of FAS 123. 
  With the high profile collapse of companies like Enron and WorldCom in late 
2001 and early 2002, stock option accounting reform was put back on the table amidst 
calls for a broader set of reforms of accounting and auditing practices, corporate 
governance, and executive compensation. FASB remained out of the fray until 
October 2002, when it began to reassess stock option accounting. In the post Enron 
era, FASB enjoyed broader support for SOE than it had in the mid-1990s, particularly 16 
 
from institutional investors, the SEC, the stock exchanges, some government officials, 
and some corporate leaders. Despite this broader base of support, technology 
companies continued to oppose stock option expensing and even persuaded some 
members of Congress to draft a bill in 2004 to protect stock options from expensing. 
In December 2004, however, FASB issued its final ruling on the matter, requiring 
expensing starting in 2005. Since then, the start date for required adoption has been 
pushed back. Some technology companies still hold out hope that the expensing rule 
will be rescinded, but this appears unlikely. 
 
Patterns of SOE Adoption 
Although FASB did not finalize an SOE requirement until December 2004, between 
July 2002 and July 2004, over 750 publicly traded companies voluntarily decided to 
adopt SOE, i.e., to formally recognize a compensation expense of stock options. Such 
an expense directly reduced their earnings, earnings per share, and potentially, their 
stock prices. Why would these companies voluntarily decide to incur such costs if the 
practice was not required by any regulatory agency, especially considering the history 
of corporate resistance to the practice? Before turning to possible explanations, it is 
useful to examine the descriptive data about the SOE adopters.  
  I acquired a list of SOE adopters from Bear Stearns, an investment banking 
and securities brokerage firm that has tracked SOE adoptions. The list provided basic 
demographic information about the adopters and the method of stock option 
expensing.
2 Bear Stearns tracked adopters through corporate press releases and media 
reports.
3  Of the 753 companies who adopted SOE between July 2002 and July 2004, 
                                                 
2 Initially, if a company adopted SOE, it could chose between three different ways to calculate current 
and past expense. This choice was not preserved in the final ruling released in December 2004.  
3 Although most of these companies did actually adopt, some announced their intentions but did not 
adopt. One example is Amazon.com, which announced their intention to adopt in July 2002, but as of 
this writing, had not actually started expensing. For the purposes of this study, this distinction does not 17 
 
68% were based in U.S., 24% were Canadian, and the remainder were incorporated in 
14 other countries in Europe, Asia, and the Caribbean. About 17% (126) of these 
companies were in the S&P 500. The average market capitalization of these 
companies was $8.2 billion, with a median of $1.2 billion.  
  Table 3.1 provides more detailed information about the industries in which 
SOE adoption was most common. The top industries include real estate investment 
trusts, precious metals, and regional banks, followed by oil and gas production, major 
banks, and property/casualty insurance. Figure 3.1 tracks the incidence of stock option 
expensing adoption from January 2002 to July 2004, the latest month for which data 
was available at the time this research was conducted. Between December 1995 and 
July 2002, only 13 publicly traded companies adopted SOE.  Three distinct peak 
 
Table 3.1: Incidence of SOE Adoption by Industry, 1995-2004 
 
Industry    # of Adopters    % of Total 
Real Estate Investment Trusts  74  9.83 
Precious Metals  46  6.11 
Regional Banks  37  4.91 
Oil and Gas Production  28  3.72 
Major Banks  27  3.59 
Property/Casualty Insurance  23  3.05 
Electric Utilities  19  2.52 
Life/Health Insurance  17  2.26 
Finance/Rental/Leasing 15  1.99 
Investment Banks/Brokers  15  1.99 
Other Metals/Minerals  14  1.86 
Telecommunications 13  1.73 
Biotechnology 11  1.46 
Financial Conglomerates  10  1.33 
Multi-Line Insurance  10  1.33 
Telecommunications Equipment  10  1.33  
Total 369  49.01 
                                                                                                                                              
raise serious theoretical issues since I am interested analyzing the symbolic adoption of SOE, which is 
adequately captured in the methodology used by Bear Stearns.  18 
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Figure 3.1: Number of SOE Adopters, January 2002 – July 2004 
periods of adoption activity are apparent: July through September 2002 (112 
companies in 14 sectors and 55 industries); January through May 2003 (198 
companies in 20 sectors and 73 industries); and February through May 2004 (210 
companies in 20 sectors and  74 industries).  Taken together, these three waves 
account for 520 (69%) of the total number of expensers between July 2002 and July 
2004.  
  When examined longitudinally at the level of industry, during the first wave, 
companies in 55 industries expensed, with the highest percentages among real estate 19 
 
investment trusts (11%), major banks (7.1%), and financial conglomerates (6.3%).  In 
the second wave, the number of industries represented increased to 73, with the 
highest concentrations among real estate investment trusts (21%), regional banks 
(5.5%) and electric utilities (5%), which represented the first significant non-finance 
industry clustering. During the third wave, companies in 74 industries expensed, and 
the concentration in finance industries diminished. The precious metals industry 
represented the highest percentage (17%), followed by oil and gas production (5%), 
and regional banks (4%). In all three of the waves, the industry composition beyond 
these leaders is fairly evenly distributed.  
  The descriptive evidence, therefore, reveals that by the end of July 2004, 753 
companies traded on the US stock markets had adopted SOE and that adoption 
occurred in three distinct waves of heightened activity. While companies in a diverse 
group of industries adopted SOE, a few industrial sectors represented a large 
proportion of the expensers, with the finance sector clearly the dominant one in all 
three periods, particularly the first two periods. Also, the composition of companies 
begins to shift towards a more diverse sectoral composition beginning in June 2003. 
Finance, electronic technology, and utilities companies increase their activity in the 
second period, while non-energy minerals, energy minerals, health technology, 
electronic technology, and technology services have notable increases in the final 
period, with non-energy minerals and health technology showing the largest increases. 
There were also significant decreases in the number of finance and utilities companies 
expensing by the third wave. In terms of industry, the data indicate that the highest 
industry concentrations were among real estate investment trusts during the first two 
periods, banks in all three periods, and precious metals and oil and gas production in 
the final period.  20 
 
  The descriptive evidence does not suggest obvious explanations regarding why 
some companies voluntarily adopted SOE while others did not, with one exception: 
the timing of the first wave. At the end of June 2002, WorldCom disclosed that it had 
overstated earnings by $6 billion. The disclosure at WorldCom accelerated public and 
regulatory pressures for corporate reform that had started with the Enron scandal in 
late 2001. Prior to July 2002, only 13 publicly traded companies had adopted SOE, 
something that was first made possible by FASB in 1995. The last adoption prior to 
the scandals occurred in April 2001. The fact that a dramatic spike in SOE adoption 
occurred in the immediate wake of the WorldCom scandal suggests that adoption may 
have been related to the concomitant intensification of public scrutiny and the 
acceleration of regulatory pressures. But exactly how was SOE adoption linked to the 
scandals? 
 
Existing Explanations of SOE Adoption 
The existing literature on voluntary SOE adoption (Aboody et al, 2003; Deshmukh et 
al., 2004; Seethamraju and Zach, 2004) has recognized that the scandals most likely 
influenced adoption patterns, but has generally placed the influence of the scandals in 
an indirect role. These studies emphasize the role of rational economic decision-
making at the firm-level and the individual incentives of managers in shaping adoption 
patterns. Although these studies acknowledge that adoption was most likely linked to 
the scandals, they treat the scandals as altering the cost-benefit calculus of rational 
economic decision making, eschewing a more in-depth analysis of the specific 
institutional and political dynamics that the scandals set in motion, and the direct 
influence that these dynamics may have had on adoption patterns.  
  In the most extensive study to date, Aboody et al. (2003: 127) argue that firms 
will voluntarily adopt SOE “only when they believe that it is cost beneficial to do so” 21 
 
and that in the wake of the scandals in 2002, the parameters for calculating the costs 
and benefits changed. They authors test hypotheses regarding the types of firms that 
would have expected positive valuation benefits from stock option expensing in the 
post-scandal environment: those more active in capital markets, those with more 
information asymmetry between management and shareholders, and those who were 
more vulnerable to political pressures (as measured by size and profitability). They 
also examine how managerial incentives  influenced adoption, hypothesizing that 
managers whose compensation was sensitive to net income would be less likely to 
adopt (because SOE adoption would reduce net income), while those with large equity 
holdings would be more likely to adopt because managers would benefit from the 
positive stock market valuation that SOE adoption would generate.  
  Seethamraju and Zach (2004) provide an analysis based on a similar core 
assumption that firms will choose to adopt SOE primarily based on a cost-benefit 
analysis, but they define costs and benefits more broadly to include nonfinancial 
metrics, such as improving a company’s image or preventing future scrutiny, 
particularly in the face of the scandals. The authors predict that firms with high levels 
of media exposure will be more likely to benefit from the positive signal of SOE in the 
post-Enron environment and that firms who had recently experienced a drop in their 
stock price would use SOE adoption to improve their public image. In addition, the 
authors predicted that firms that had “something to hide” (as measured by managed 
earnings) would be more likely to adopt SOE to prevent future scrutiny. Finally, they 
predict that firms with a strong governance structure (as measured by the percentage 
of outsiders serving on the board) will be more likely to expense because the board has 
more oversight over management. In the third study, Deshmukh et al. (2004) 
examined the impact of both the alignment of management and shareholders’ interests 22 
 
(as measured by the level of share ownership by management), and information 
asymmetry on the likelihood of SOE adoption.  
  Overall, these studies present a somewhat disjointed and incomplete picture of 
the determinants of SOE adoption. The findings indicate that SOE adoption was 
positively associated with capital market activity, the size of managers’ equity 
holdings, company size, and media exposure. Although Aboody et al. (2003) found 
that firms with less information asymmetry (as measured by the level of institutional 
ownership) were less likely to adopt, Deshmukh et al (2004) found that firms with less 
information asymmetry (as measured by transparency) were more likely to adopt. The 
former argues when better information is available to stakeholders, a firm will not 
perceive that SOE adoption will lead to positive valuation benefits. The latter argues 
that less information asymmetry is a sign of good governance, which will lead to 
expensing. In terms of other corporate governance variables, the second study finds 
that stronger governance (as measured by % of outsiders on the board) had no impact 
on SOE adoption, while the third study finds that management-shareholder interest 
alignment (as measured by the % of ownership of management) made firms more 
likely to expense. The latter argues that such alignment is also a sign of good 
corporate governance. One of the major weaknesses of the literature, therefore, is that 
it is difficult to compare the findings because these studies do not use similar 
measures. In addition, the operationalization of some variables is questionable, such as 
using management stock ownership as a proxy for management-shareholder interest 
alignment (Deshmukh et al. 2004), and size and profitability to measure vulnerability 
to political pressures stemming from the scandals (Aboody et al, 2003). Finally, all 
three of these studies are cross-sectional and only examined the first wave of SOE 
adopters in 2002.  23 
 
More substantially, however, the existing literature has accorded a primary role 
to rational, economic decision-making (either at the firm level or individual executive 
level), i.e., firms will only adopt when it is cost beneficial to them or to their 
executives to do so. The existing research on SOE adoption ignores the vast 
sociological literature that provides ample evidence that organizations adopt practices 
for reasons other than cost-benefit considerations, for example, as a reaction to 
coercive pressures, to signal legitimacy within prevailing institutional norms, or to 
cope with uncertainty by imitating successful organizations (DiMaggio and Powell). 
Although the adoption of a practice for these reasons may result in financial benefits 
for the organization and executives, the assumption that the primary motivator of 
adoption is a cost-benefit analysis that accurately anticipates that SOE will lead to an 
increase in share price ignores the broader social, institutional, regulatory, and 
political environments in which organizations are embedded, and the complex ways in 
which forces in these environments shape organizational action. The work of Mezias 
(1990, 1995), Carruthers (1995), and Hatherly et al (2005) has demonstrated that 
sociological, and in particular institutional, approaches have significant analytic 
potential to help us understand the adoption of accounting practices. 
  In other words, although the existing literature recognizes that the corporate 
scandals of 2001 and 2002 created pressures for reform that may have influenced the 
voluntary adoption of SOE, it relegates these pressures to an indirect role. My 
intention is to take seriously the political and regulatory pressures for corporate reform 
that were set in motion by the corporate scandals, and the role these pressures may 
have played in SOE adoption patterns. Institutional theory and its recent expansion to 
include the more active structuration of organizational fields (Fligstein 2001, 
Lounsbury et al. 2003) provides a useful lens for identifying some of the primary 
forces that may have influenced adoption: regulatory pressures embodied in direct 24 
 
investigations, public scrutiny of corporations through the media, political pressure as 
expressed through shareholder activism, and regulatory pressures embodied in 
FASB’s attempt to require SOE. In the next section, I will take a closer look at the 
scandals that began with Enron in late 2001, the dynamics they set in motion, and the 
emergence of the symbolic significance of SOE in order to develop specific 
hypotheses about SOE adoption patterns.  
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CHAPTER 4 
SCANDALS, REACTIONS, AND THE EMERGENCE OF  
STOCK OPTION ACCOUNTING AS SYMBOL 
 
This section will provide a detailed overview of how the issue of stock options and 
stock option accounting became connected to the scandals and the broader movement 
for corporate reform that emerged in 2002, and how SOE became a symbol of 
normative organizational legitimacy in this environment. My primary purpose is to 
situate stock option expensing within the detailed context of the corporate scandals 
and reactions to them. More specifically, I will show how, in the immediate aftermath 
of the scandals, stock option expensing became a symbol of normative legitimacy 
because it was a way for organizations to signal their recognition of and adherence to 
emerging norms for more transparent accounting and constraints on executive equity 
compensation. In addition, this section reviews how the scandals set in motion a 
regulatory threat in the attempt, ultimately successful, of the FASB to make stock 
option expensing mandatory, and suggests how this may have effected SOE’s 
symbolic significance and adoption patterns. 
 
The Collapse of Enron and Its Consequences 
The Enron Corporation began to publicly collapse in October of 2001 and filed for 
bankruptcy in early December 2001. Initially, the extent of the fraud and the ultimate 
consequences were uncertain. Immediate investigations into Enron were launched by 
the Justice Department, Department of Labor, and the Securities and Exchange  
Commission, soon to be followed by the US Congress. Although the financial 
mechanisms used by Enron were complex, the primary issues raised by the bankruptcy 
included fraudulent accounting schemes developed with the assistance of some of26 
 
Wall Street’s largest firms; the lack of independence of Enron’s chief auditor, Arthur 
Andersen; the manipulation of energy markets, one of Enron’s primary areas of 
business; the rapid decimation of employee retirement accounts; and the self-serving 
actions of executives enriching themselves as they engaged in fraud to drive up short-
term share prices. Enron was certainly not unique in its behavior, but the scale, 
complexity, and arrogance of Enron’s machinations seemed unparalleled at the time 
and involved the complicity of not only major accounting firms, but also prominent 
Wall Street investment banks. Viewed from a broader historical perspective, the 
collapse of Enron was the first significant challenge to the dominant ideology of 
shareholder value that had emerged in the 1980s, an ideology in which corporations 
exist primarily to enrich shareholders by boosting short-term share prices and in which 
any individual could become wealthy by investing in the stock market (Lowenstein 
2004). This ideology reached its most sophisticated and unabashed realization in 
Enron’s activities.  
  At first, public scrutiny and investigative energy focused on Enron’s 
executives and its auditor, Arthur Andersen. In January 2002, the SEC also began an 
investigation into the connections between Wall Street financial firms and Enron, 
which was soon followed by similar Congressional investigations, a class action 
lawsuit filed by Enron shareholders which listed a number of Wall Street firms as 
defendants, and finally, an investigation by Eliot Spitzer, Attorney General of New 
York State, into the practices of the nation’s major financial institutions.
4 These 
companies, such as Citigroup, JP Morgan, and Merrill Lynch, were accused of helping 
Enron to create and fund special purpose entities that removed debt off Enron’s books 
and bolster its stock price. They were also accused of misrepresenting Enron’s 
                                                 
4  “SEC Examines Ties Between Banks and Enron,” Wall Street Journal,  January 15 2002;  K. 
Kranhold and J. Weil, “Enron Holders Suit Adds New Defendants,” Wall Street Journal, April 8, 2002.  27 
 
financial condition to investors. In addition to auditors and financial conglomerates, 
the Enron crisis sparked scrutiny of the energy industry. In early March, the attorney 
general of California sued four energy providers for manipulating California’s energy 
supply between 1998 and 2000. In May 2002, the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission launched its own investigation into the manipulation of energy markets. 
These investigations illuminated various accounting schemes and market 
manipulations used by not just Enron, but other energy companies.  
  In addition to these investigations, the collapse of Enron sparked broad public 
debate and conflict about the broader institutional framework in which corporations 
operate, such as formal legal rules and informal norms regarding accounting and 
auditing practices, corporate governance, and executive compensation.  These debates 
and conflicts manifested themselves through the actions and rhetoric of a number of 
different actors: politicians, regulators, the accounting profession, corporate 
executives, business elites and intellectuals, journalists, shareholder groups, and social 
and economic justice organizations. An immediate tension emerged between groups 
calling for new regulations and legislation, and other groups who claimed that Enron 
and other companies were just bad apples within an otherwise law-abiding universe of 
corporations. The initial calls for reform were sounded by the SEC, Democratic 
legislators, and the accounting industry itself, and focused on the problem of insuring 
transparency for investors. Corporate leaders and the Bush Administration quickly 
tried to emphasize the limited reach of the behaviors connected to the scandals. As the 
magnitude of the problems of Enron came into sharper focus and as more regulators, 
legislators, business intellectuals, and shareholder activists entered the fray, a diverse 
set of issues emerged in the public debate as targets of potential reform, including: 
regulation of the accounting and auditing industry; conflicts of interest within auditing 
firms who perform consulting services for their auditing clients; executive 28 
 
compensation; fraud and speculation on Wall Street; better protection of retirement 
assets; and the adequacy of the penalties for corporate crime. Amidst these calls for 
specific reforms, deeper questions were raised about not only the behavior of 
executives at Enron, but the behavior of corporations, their leaders, and the efficacy of 
regulatory and enforcement agencies.  
  Although the reform movement gathered steam as the number of companies 
implicated and the exposure of accounting fraud at other companies grew, legislation 
fundamentally altering the regulation of corporate reporting, auditing practices, the 
independence of boards of directors, and the reform of executive compensation faced 
serious opposition from a large segment of the corporate community, the accounting 
industry, the Bush administration, and some lawmakers, all of whom portrayed Enron 
as an aberration and calls for deeper reform as ill-founded. The actors pushing for 
wide-reaching corporate reforms, including Democratic legislators, some institutional 
investors, and some regulators, were not in a strong position politically until the end of 
June 2002, when WorldCom announced that it had overstated its earnings by $6 
billion, a figure that dwarfed the amount of the accounting fraud uncovered at Enron. 
  The announcement by WorldCom lent serious legitimacy to the critics who 
claimed that the situation of Enron was not an aberration, but the result of more 
systemic problems relating to corporate reporting, governance, and regulation. Even 
President Bush, who up to this point had not taken any serious steps towards 
addressing the problems at Enron, made a speech on Wall Street in early July 2002 
decrying corporate fraud. Bush also created the Corporate Fraud Task Force within the 
Department of Justice to coordinate the investigative efforts of the Department and all 
other agencies involved in investigating corporate crime. The disclosure by 
WorldCom revived and accelerated legislative conflict and action, leading to the 
hurried passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in August 2002. This act established new 29 
 
laws relating to auditing processes, the auditing industry, corporate reporting, insider 
trading, and protecting investors. It also established a new accounting oversight board 
within the SEC but did not address stock option accounting. Although the passage of 
Sarbanes-Oxley was seen as a victory for corporate reformers and quelled some of the 
pressures for reform, its ultimate reach and long-term effectiveness have been 
questioned since its inception. The movement for broader reforms remained active 
after the passage of the Act, but more far-reaching legislation has yet to be 
implemented.  
  In hindsight, it is questionable that the movement for corporate reform that 
emerged after the Enron collapse was going to lead to broad and significant changes, 
but this was not a foregone conclusion at the time. The reform movement that Enron 
and subsequent scandals set in motion had potentially powerful consequences (Levitt 
2002). The swift collapse of prominent firms such as Enron and Arthur Andersen 
revealed that the legitimacy and survival of organizations engaged in criminal activity 
were indeed at risk. Also at stake were the normative and cognitive legitimacy of 
corporate reporting processes, accounting standards, the accounting profession, capital 
markets, and corporate governance. In addition, the privileged positions of corporate 
executives, boards of directors, the investment banking community, and the corporate 
consulting industry as a whole, as well as the capabilities of regulatory organizations 
such as the SEC, FASB, and others, were all brought into question. The corporate 
scandals at Enron and other organizations, therefore, exposed a number of systemic 
problems within corporate America and generated a serious threat to the accepted 
ways in which corporations were run, executives compensated, capital invested, and 
markets operated. The scandals ignited broader public discussions and debates about 
criminal behavior in America’s boardrooms and on Wall Street, as well as the 
necessity of more comprehensive changes to the ways in which corporations are 30 
 
regulated. It is within these broader discussions and debates that the issue of stock 
option expensing emerged, after being out of the spotlight for almost seven years.  
 
The Emergence of Stock Option Expensing as Symbol  
To gain a better sense of the renewed debate about stock option accounting, I 
examined mainstream business media coverage from November 1, 2001 to July 31, 
2004.
5  In the initial media coverage of the events at Enron, stock options and their 
accounting treatment received a little attention, but the focus of most of the media 
coverage in December 2001 and January 2002 was on the fraudulent accounting 
schemes used by Enron and the complicity of Arthur Andersen in the creation and 
approval of these schemes. The role of stock options and their accounting treatment 
emerged more prominently in early February 2002. At this time, Senators Levin and 
McCain introduced a bill that would have required companies to expense their stock 
options if they wanted to take the tax deduction they are entitled to when employees 
exercise their stock options. The Senators were heading up the Senate’s investigation 
of Enron and indicated that the bill was motivated by the accounting problems of 
Enron. As the Wall Street Journal explained:  
 
  Mr. Levin suggested Enron’s issuance of stock options-and claim of the tax 
  deduction-was part of a broader interest within the company of moving 
  obligations off the books and out of public view, as happened with Enron’s 
  dubious networks of affiliate partner ships. “The situation is partly about 
  misleading annual statements, and that’s what our issue is about,” Mr. Levin 
 said.
6 
The bill was effectively killed by the same group of high-tech lobbyists who had 
successfully derailed FASB’s efforts at imposing mandatory SOE in 1994. The 
                                                 
5 The sources included the Wall Street Journal, Business Week, Fortune, the New York Times, and 
Forbes. 
6 Greg Hitt, “Senators Probing Enron Will Try to Repeal Stock-Option Tax Rule,” Wall Street Journal.  
February 7, 2002. 31 
 
introduction of the bill, however, opened up a broader debate in the business press 
about stock options, their accounting treatment, and the connection to Enron.  
  In March and April 2002, a number of articles appeared in the mainstream 
business press describing and analyzing a growing movement in support of stock 
option expensing.
7 Through their use of such sources as government officials, 
executives, consultants, industry and trade association representatives, institutional 
investors, and academics, these articles articulate the primary explanations in the 
management discourse regarding the connection between executive stock options, 
their accounting treatment, and the scandals. One explanation argued that stock 
options helped generate the stock market bubble that began in the late 1990s by 
providing executives with strong incentives to boost short-term earnings in any way, 
whether legitimate or fraudulent. As the Wall Street Journal, in describing the critics 
of stock options, noted: “options have bred a culture of irresponsible greed.”
8 The 
system of accounting machinations at Enron was an example of this culture taken to 
its logical extreme, with executives making large profits on their stock options as they 
ran the company into the ground and hid behind arcane and fraudulent accounting 
schemes. A second connection made between stock options, their accounting 
treatment, and the scandals was that the lack of a formal requirement to expense stock 
options created incentives for boards of directors to increase the size of executive 
stock option grants, which in turn intensified the incentives for executives to boost 
short-term stock prices. Finally, stock options and their accounting treatment provided, 
according to Jeffrey Skilling, former CEO of Enron, “an egregious way to inflate a 
                                                 
7 D. Henry et al., “Too Much of A Good Incentive,” Business Week, March 4, 2002; G. Hitt and J. 
Schlesinger, “Perk Police: Stock  Options Come Under Fire in Wake of Enron’s Collapse,” Wall Street 
Journal, March 26, 2002; H. Gleckman, “Options: Its Time for Companies to Come Clean,” Business 
Week, April 1, 2002;  H. Jenkins, “Business World: Much Ado about Stock Options,” April 3, 2002; J.   
Whitman, “Stock Options Face Scrutiny in the Wake of Enron,” Wall Street Journal, April 3, 2002.  
8 G. Hitt and J. Schlesinger, “Perk Police: Stock  Options Come Under Fire in Wake of Enron’s 
Collapse,” Wall Street Journal, March 26, 2002 32 
 
company’s reported earnings.”
9 Hence, as the analysis of Enron’s collapse proceeded 
in the mainstream business press, a clear indictment of stock options emerged: their 
excessive use as a component of executive compensation motivated a variety of 
practices through which executives attempted to bolster short-term earnings, which, in 
turn, fueled the escalation of the stock market in the late 1990s. Furthermore, the 
favorable accounting treatment of stock options exacerbated these problems and more 
generally stigmatized their use as fraudulent, or as the Council of Institutional 
Investors described it, stock options “[turned] companies into Ponzi schemes.”
10 
  As stock options and their accounting treatment became identified as closely 
connected to the scandals, a number of actors came out in favor of stock option 
expensing as one solution to the myriad problems that the scandals exposed. The most 
prominent proponents of SOE included certain lawmakers and regulators, academics, 
and institutional investors. Senators Levin and McCain were the most vocal legislators 
supporting expensing, but their actions, described above, were part of a broader set of 
efforts on the part of Congress to deal with the many manifestations of corporate fraud 
exposed by the collapse of Enron.
11 Another proponent was Alan Greenspan, 
Chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank, who on March 27, 2002, came out in support 
of stock option expensing as he simultaneously voiced his personal opposition to “too 
much regulation” in response to the scandals.
12 Greenspan argued that “one step 
toward better earnings quality would be forcing companies to treat the value of stock 
options granted to employees as an expense.”
13 Similarly, in a commentary piece in 
the Wall Street Journal, Joseph Stiglitz, Professor of Economics at Columbia and 
                                                 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
11 G. Ip, “Mood Swings in Favor of Regulation: Congress Begins to Deliver on Plethora of Bills,” Wall 
Street Journal, March 29, 2002. 
12 G. Ip, “Greenspan Warns Against Too Much Regulation,” Wall Street Journal, March 27, 2002.  
13 Ibid. 33 
 
former member of President Clinton’s Council of Economic Advisors, also supported 
the expensing of stock options on the grounds that it provided more accurate 
information and that “such information is like a public good: better standards-more 
transparency-lead to better resource allocation and better functioning markets.”
14  
  A number of shareholder groups, including institutional investors, mutual fund 
managers, and individual gadfly activists, also supported stock option expensing. 
Although most shareholder groups remained out of the fray during the battles over 
SOE in the mid-1990s, the scandals changed the position of many on the issue. For 
example, on March 15, 2002, the Council of Institutional Investors, which represents 
the largest institutional investors, came out in favor of SOE, arguing that "the size of 
option programs has exploded, the true costs of fixed-price options are obscured, and 
shareholders have lost their  right to vote on many option plans, so many feel that 
disclosure-based solutions are no longer adequate."
15 Echoing this sentiment, TIAA-
CREF, one of the largest institutional investors, sent a letter that endorsed stock option 
expensing to the chairmen of over 1,700 public companies. The letter stated that SOE 
“contributes to clear, straightforward and high-quality financial reporting, enhancing 
credibility that surely will be highly valued in the post-Enron market.”
16 Finally, 
Warren Buffett, the high profile investor and shareholder activist was a very vocal 
proponent of SOE as a way to improve the transparency of financial statements. In an 
oft-cited statement, Buffet mused: “If options aren’t a form of compensation, then 
what are they? If compensation isn’t an expense, what is it? If expenses do not belong 
on the income statement, where in the world should they go?”
17  Supporters of stock 
                                                 
14 J. Stiglitz, “Accounting for Options,” Wall Street Journal, May 3, 2002.   
15 “Council of Institutional investors Backs Expensing of Stock Options.” Tax Management Financial 
Planning Journal, April 16, 2002.  
16 J. Lublin, “Leading the News: TIAA-CREF Wants Options Seen as Expenses,” Wall Street Journal, 
July 24, 2002.  
17 “Warren Buffett Rips into Stock Option Accounting,” Directorship,  June 1999.  34 
 
option expensing, therefore, included members of Congress, government officials, 
shareholder activists and institutional investors, and some business elites and 
intellectuals. Their support rested primarily on the grounds that SOE would add much 
needed transparency to financial statements and help to curb some of the excesses that 
created the problems at Enron and fed the stock market bubble. There were also, 
however, strong opponents of the views of stock options as villain and SOE as 
solution, including the Bush Administration, other legislators, government officials, 
the high-tech industry, and executives in other industries The Bush Administration and 
its allies in Congress opposed most proposed regulation, including SOE. The 
administration’s opposition to regulation makes a great deal of sense considering its 
consistent ideological commitment to small government and its close network and 
financial ties to corporate donors. Another opponent within government included 
Harvey Pitt, then Chairman of the SEC, who, in a well-reasoned defense, argued that 
stock option expensing was a red herring: requiring expensing would not prevent 
future Enrons, but that more controls over how executives were compensated would.
18 
Certain legislators, such as Joseph Lieberman, who had been very active in opposing 
SOE in the mid-1990s (Levitt 2002), were also active in opposing Congressional 
attempts to impose new requirements, as were legislators representing districts with 
heavy concentrations of technology companies, such as Silicon Valley.  
  In addition to opponents within the federal government, a number of corporate 
executives and industry associations were against mandatory stock option expensing. 
The high-tech industry presented the most active opposition to SOE, both historically 
and during the post-Enron debates. Their primary argument opposing mandatory SOE 
has been that since there is no reliable and consistent way to measure the value of 
stock options, SOE actually distorts financial statements rather than improves 
                                                 
18 G. Ip et al., “Pitt Calls for Stricter Control of Options,” Wall Street Journal, April 5, 2002.  35 
 
transparency. High-tech executives and trade groups have also argued that any 
requirement to expense stock options would constrain their ability to grant options to 
employees, which would in turn limit their ability to recruit the best talent, and in turn, 
stifle American innovation. Although the high-tech industry has been very persuasive 
in using this logic, such claims rest on a foundation of self-interest. First, as an 
industry that has relied on high levels of stock option grants, these organizations stood 
the most to lose, financially, if forced to expense the value of their stock options. 
Furthermore, an SOE requirement would make the large option grants of technology 
company executives (Blasi et al. 2003) more transparent and open to criticism. Such 
potential transparency most likely also fueled resistance to mandatory SOE expressed 
by some executives in non-technology industries, who have continued to receive very 
large and very valuable stock option grants. (Blasi et al. 2003). Despite the apparent 
contradictions of executives’ defense of stock options, in the wake of the scandals, the 
technology industry was quick to organize against an SOE requirement and scored 
significant victories by defeating the Levin-McCain bill and by preventing the 
inclusion of an SOE requirement in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 
  It is clear that stock option accounting emerged as a topic of heated debate and 
high visibility after the collapse of Enron.
19 Within these initial debates, FASB 
remained remarkably silent on the issue. Overall, the various opponents of SOE 
appeared to be on less stable ground than they were during the first battle over SOE in 
the mid-1990s, but they were far from powerless. Despite this opposition and the lack 
of any SOE regulation from FASB or Congress, proponents of stock option expensing 
were successful at framing SOE as a reform that could alleviate some of the problems 
driving the scandals: accounting fraud, excessive executive compensation, and the 
                                                 
19 The number of articles in ABI Inform discussing stock option expensing increased from 71 in 2000 to 
107 in 2001 to 614 in 2002 (175 in the first six months), and 440 in 2003.  36 
 
inflation of the stock market bubble. This success was evident in the much broader 
support that SOE had in the post-Enron era. In the mid-1990s, the battle over 
expensing was essentially a battle between the accounting profession and the 
technology industry, with Congress intervening in the 11
th hour to help the technology 
industry force a compromise from FASB. Most other actors remained out of the 
picture. The success of SOE proponents in the post-Enron world was also evident in 
the first ever significant wave of voluntary SOE adoption activity that followed the 
massive accounting at WorldCom and the concomitant acceleration in reform 
pressures.  
  The supporters of SOE were successful at framing SOE as a practice that was 
symbolic of a new normative environment, which focused attention on the virtues of 
accounting transparency, limits on excessive executive compensation, a mitigation of 
widespread conflicts of interest within financial institutions and the stock market, and 
increased punishment for those engaged in corporate fraud. For neoinstitutional 
theory, accounting practices are one of the most common ways that organizations 
signal rationality and legitimacy (Meyer and Rowan 1977, Carruthers 1995). In the 
post-Enron environment, stock option expensing became a way for organizations to 
signal their normative legitimacy by demonstrating their willingness to make changes 
in line with emerging norms, or as Roman Weil, a professor of accounting at the 
University of Chicago, told the Wall Street Journal in analyzing the first SOE 
adopters: “corporations are trying to signal to investors that they are squeaky clean and 
not the bad guys.”
20  
   To gain a better sense of the symbolic meaning of SOE, I examined all press 
releases or media reports relating to SOE adoption among the Fortune 500. Of the 51 
organizations within this group that adopted during the first wave of initial activity in 
                                                 
20 “Fighting Coke’s Lead Could Bring Big Changes,” Wall Street Journal, July 16, 2002.  37 
 
July and August of 2002, 31 (61%) issued statements to the press about the adoption. I 
performed a content analysis of these press statements, and three primary types of 
explanations emerged. The most common (42% of all press releases during this 
period) had a tone of moral righteousness that the organization was a leader in the new 
normative environment by stating that SOE adoption was a sign of integrity, honesty, 
responsibility, accountability, or similar qualities. For example, in August 2002, 
Citibank announced that stock option expensing was yet another sign that the 
company was at the “forefront of progressive industry change.” Similarly, MetLife 
stated that stock option expensing was “the right thing to do and, alongside other 
leading companies, is part of an ongoing effort to help restore confidence in Corporate 
America.”
21 Also, in explaining the adoption of SOE, the Calpine Corporation, noted 
that it was “committed to the highest level of integrity,”
22 while Bank of America 
stated that SOE was an indicator that it was “dedicated to the highest level of 
corporate accountability.”
23  
  The second type of explanation, employed by 10 companies (32% of all press 
statements during July and August 2002) highlighted the company’s awareness of the 
new demands of investors and shareholders for increased financial transparency. The 
PPL Corporation, for example, claimed that stock option expensing indicated the 
company’s “commitment to clearly communicate financial results to investors.”
24 
Similarly, Cinergy stated that SOE represented its “ongoing commitment to ensuring 
that compensation costs are clearly recorded in our financial statements.”
25 In a press 
statement, General Electric’s CEO noted that “investors clearly want these expenses 
                                                 
21 Metlife Corporation, “Metlife Employee Stock Options to be Expensed Beginning in January 2002,” 
August 12, 2002.  
22 Calpine Corporation, “Calpine to Expense Future Stock Options,” August 27, 2002.  
23 Bank of America, “Bank of America Will Expense Employee Stock Options,” August 12, 2002.  
24  PPL Corporation, “PPL Corporation to Expense Future Stock Options,” October 4, 2002.  
25 Cinergy Corporation, “Cinergy Corp. to Expense Future Stock Options,” July 24, 2002.  38 
 
incorporated into results and we will do so.”
26 Other companies, such as AIG, simply 
stated that stock option expensing is “in the best interest of our shareholders.”
27 The 
third type of explanation, only used by 3 of those 31 organizations with press releases 
during this time, focused on the importance of stock options a tool of human resource 
management, stating that stock options have been an important way in which the 
company recruits, maintains, and/or motivates talent. This was not used as a direct 
justification for expensing, but was mentioned alongside a statement explaining that 
the organization was adopting SOE.  
  These examples reveal that in the initial stage of SOE adoption, organizations 
presented stock option expensing as a symbol of their legitimacy within an emerging 
normative environment. A vast majority (75%) of organizations that issued press 
statements either made grand claims about their normative legitimacy within this new 
environment or more modestly acknowledged the new norms of financial transparency 
articulated by shareholders and investors, and their adherence to these norms. Both 
types of explanations reveal that SOE was a way that organizations attempted to 
enhance or bolster their normative legitimacy in the post-scandal world. In addition, 
because neither FASB nor Congress had taken any action to make adoption 
mandatory, the act remained voluntary, and this most likely made the action a more 
powerful symbol, particularly among early adopters. If a corporation adopted SOE, it 
was doing so on its own, taking active steps to make amends. Moreover, SOE 
adoption was unusual, if not unique, in having this symbolic character to address the 
multiple issues raised by the scandals. Few other actions that a company could take 
had the same symbolic power at this point. This symbolism would soon begin to 
change, however, as a new actor stepped into the ring.  
                                                 
26 R.E. Silverman, “Leading the News: GE to Expense Stock Options Held by Workers.” Wall Street 
Journal. August 1, 2002.  
27 AIG Corporation, “AIG to Expense Employee Stock Options,” August 11, 2002.  39 
 
Changes in the Institutional Environment: FASB and Regulatory Pressures 
In the immediate aftermath of the Enron and WorldCom scandals, FASB remained 
silent about the issue of stock option expensing. In late 2002, important changes began 
to occur that eventually led to FASB adopting new rules in 2004 that required stock 
option expensing. However, the perception that SOE would become mandatory 
appeared to occur much earlier than the official implementation of FASB’s 
requirement. FASB’s attempt to make SOE mandatory began on October 9, 2002 
when Robert Herz, who was then the chairman of FASB, told a group of investor 
relations professionals that he believed that attitudes had changed to the point that 
there was support for mandatory stock option expensing. Although this comment 
received little media attention, it foreshadowed what would soon follow. In addition, 
on November 8, 2002, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) issued a 
draft proposal to make stock option expensing mandatory for non-US companies. 
Although the IASB’s standards do not apply to U.S. companies, the proposal was 
widely perceived as something that would exert significant pressure on FASB to adopt 
similar standards. An article in the San Jose Mercury News the following day cited 
both a top Silicon Valley attorney and the president of a software industry trade 
association describing their perception that the IASB’s action would most likely lead 
FASB to make SOE mandatory.
28  
  However, the perception that SOE would become mandatory seems to have 
emerged even earlier than this. A survey conducted by Mercer Human Resource 
Consulting in August 2002 found that 87% of the 200 U.S. companies surveyed 
believed that mandatory stock option expensing was inevitable.
29 This broad 
                                                 
28 M. Schwanhausser, “International Board’s Plan for Expensing Options Irks High-Tech Executives,” 
San Jose Mercury News, November 8, 2002.  
29 M. Katz, “The Implications of Stock Option Expesning: It’s Closer Than You Think,” Employee 
Benefit Plan Review, November 2002.   40 
 
perception of an inevitable requirement most likely signaled the beginning of a shift in 
the significance of SOE away from being a symbol of normative legitimacy. Once it 
became evident that the practice was going to be required, its ability to function as 
symbol of an organization’s special status as recognizing a new normative 
environment was most likely diluted. Adoption of SOE may still have signaled 
legitimacy once it became widely perceived as mandatory, but this legitimacy may 
have become more regulative in nature. A more detailed look at the press release 
activity around SOE adoption provides evidence that a shift away from SOE as 
symbol of normative legitimacy began to occur around August 2002.  
  Figure 4.1 provides shows the number of press releases or press statements 
made by Fortune 500 companies. The graph shows a dramatic spike and then drop in 
the number of press releases issued by adopters after August 2002. During July and 
August 2002, 61% of all Fortune 500 adopters issued a press release about SOE 
adoption. As described in the previous section, the justifications for SOE adoption 
during these two months focused primarily on appeals to SOE as a symbol of 
normative legitimacy within the post-Enron environment. From September 2002 to 
July 2004, both the volume and tone of press releases changed dramatically. 
Only 12 of the 72 (16%) of the Fortune 500 companies that adopted SOE issued press 
releases during this time, and only two of these statements presented the action as a 
sign of the organizations leadership in corporate governance, accountability, or ethical 
standards. The tone of most of these statements focused on SOE as a way to meet the 
new demands of shareholders for financial transparency. The dramatic reduction in the 
volume of the press releases and the shift in their tone suggests that after August 2002, 
the significance of SOE as symbol of normative legitimacy diminished, and this shift  
was most likely influenced by the perception among many organizations, by August 
2002, that SOE would become mandatory.  41 
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Figure 4.1: Number of Press Releases Regarding SOE Adoption 
Issued by the Fortune 500, January 2002 – July 2004 
 
  These expectations regarding an imminent requirement proved to be accurate 
as FASB followed quickly behind the November 2002 action of the IASB. On March 
13, 2003, FASB formally voted to add stock option accounting to its agenda in 2003, 
and on May 12, 2003, voted to require companies to adopt SOE and announced that a 
formal proposal would be released later in the year. In October 2003, FASB 
announced that it intended to require SOE beginning in 2005, but also that it would 
not release any further details until early 2004. This statement set in motion the final 42 
 
regulatory battle over SOE, a battle that resembled those that occurred in 1994 
between FASB and the high-tech industry. However, in 2004, the technology industry 
had much less support for its opposition to FASB that it did in 1994. On March 31, 
2004, FASB formally announced that it would require stock option expensing in 2005. 
Following this announcement, a 90 day comment period on the decision commenced, 
during which a group of technology companies heavily lobbied Congressional leaders. 
In reaction to this, the leaders of the Big Four accounting firms and the SEC urged 
Congress not to get involved. On December 16, 2004, FASB finally issued its final 
statement, which required stock option expensing by the 3
rd quarter of 2005 for most 
companies.  
The preceding discussion of the connections between stock option accounting 
and the corporate scandals of 2001 and 2002 has revealed that stock option accounting 
became a target of much discussion and debate in the wake of the Enron scandal. A 
number of prominent actors in government, academia, the press, and the investor 
community believed that the excessive use of stock options had driven not only the 
behavior of Enron executives but also the inflation of the stock market bubble and its 
subsequent bursting. The fact that companies were not required to reveal the cost of 
stock options in their financial statements only exacerbated the problem and made the 
mechanism itself appear fraudulent. Stock option accounting, therefore, became a 
symbol of a broader system of behaviors at the root of the scandals at Enron and other 
companies. As an immediate consequence, the expensing of stock options became a 
way for organizations to symbolically signal their normative legitimacy in the post-
scandal environment. Accounting regulators capitalized on this new normative 
environment to push for mandatory expensing, and as this regulatory threat became 
obvious it appeared that the symbolic meaning of SOE began to shift away from 
normative legitimacy, perhaps towards regulative legitimacy.   
43 
CHAPTER 5 
HYPOTHESES, DATA ANALYSIS, AND RESULTS 
 
While many companies could have potentially benefited from adopting SOE and 
invoking this symbol, one of the primary claims of this paper is that the companies 
that were more likely to adopt SOE in this environment were those that faced some 
type of challenge to their legitimacy.  The literature on the defense of organizational 
legitimacy has focused almost exclusively on impression management techniques that 
organizations use when their legitimacy is challenged. The analysis that follows will 
reveal that organizations also engage in symbolic practice adoption in the face of 
challenges to their legitimacy.  
  Although there has been little theoretical development regarding what 
constitutes a threat to organizational legitimacy, previous literature has examined a 
variety of threats, such as accidents, scandals, and product safety incidents (Marcus 
and Goodman 1991, Perrow 1981); bankruptcy (Hambrick and D’Aveni 1998, Sutton 
and Callahan 1987); negative media publicity of destructive business practices 
(Elsbach 1994, Metzler 2001) offshore reincorporation (Johnson and Holub 2003); and 
social activism (Elsbach 1994). In the wake of the scandals at Enron and other 
companies, the primary legitimacy challenges that emerged took the form of direct 
investigations by a variety of regulatory agencies, negative media scrutiny, and 
shareholder activism.  
  When their legitimacy is under attack, organizations are likely to engage in 
symbolic actions through rhetorical devices and restructuring (Ashforth & Gibbs 1990, 
Suchman 1995). One of the most important types of restructuring is what Suchman 
(1995: 598-599) has called disassociation, in which the organization “employs 
structural change to symbolically distance” itself from executives, “delegitimized44 
 
 procedures, structures, and even geographic locales.” However, efforts at 
restructuring “require a light touch and sensitivity to environmental reactions” since 
“indiscriminate structural shifts may make the organizational appear unstable and 
unreliable.” (Suchman 1995: 598-599) Therefore, acts of restructuring intended to 
defend or repair organizational legitimacy will likely be closely connected to the 
legitimacy challenge. In the post-scandal environment, SOE adoption was a logical 
way for organizations to deal with legitimacy challenges embodied in investigations, 
media scrutiny, and shareholder activism because these threats focused primarily on 
accounting fraud, corporate reporting practices, executive compensation, corporate 
governance practices, or the malfeasance of those in the highest ranks of corporate 
America. These forces challenged both the regulative and normative legitimacy of 
specific organizations. This section provides a more detailed picture of different types 
of legitimacy challenges that organizations faced in the post-Enron environment and 
develop specific hypotheses regarding how the companies that were vulnerable to 
these challenges were more likely to adopt SOE.  
 
Hypotheses: Scandals, Investigations, and Media Scrutiny 
One of the most significant challenges to organizational legitimacy after the fall of 
Enron were direct investigations into various types of corporate crime. Investigations 
that are conducted by enforcement agencies represent a challenge to the regulative 
legitimacy of organizations since they examine whether organizations are in violation 
of specific laws. To provide a more complete picture of the investigations in the 
periods immediate preceding and following the Enron scandal, I collected data from 
publicly available information of various regulatory agencies and media sources. Since 
the number of companies under any type of investigation is extremely large due to a 
high number of minor infractions, I used two sources to focus the data collection on 45 
 
the most significant cases: the SEC’s Annual Reports from 2001 to 2003, which list 
“significant enforcement actions,” and the reports to the President that the Corporate 
Fraud Task Force (CFTF), an interagency group established by President Bush in July 
2002, published in July 2003 and July 2004. The latter provide details about the 
contributions of the task force members: the Department of Justice, FBI, IRS, 
Department of Labor, Department of the Treasury, SEC, Commodities Futures 
Trading Commission, Federal Energy Regulatory Committee, Federal 
Communications Commission, and United States Postal Inspection Service. I 
supplemented this information with media reports from the period, and developed a 
master list of 179 companies that became the subjects of investigation between 
January 2001 and July 2004. This list, therefore, represents the investigations that 
regulators saw as the most significant, and therefore, the ones that were likely to 
receive the broadest media attention and a share of the limited pool of resources 
allocated to regulatory and enforcement agencies, and in turn, the ones that posed the 
greatest threats to organizational legitimacy.  
  Figure 5.1 shows the timing of investigations started between January 2002 
and July 2004.  At the time of the Enron bankruptcy (December 2001), 39 companies 
were already under an existing investigation. Between January and May 2002, 59 
more companies had come under investigation. The number of investigations drops 
sharply after May 2002, but between June 2002 and July 2004, 81 more investigations 
began. In the post-Enron period of this study between January 2002 and July 2004), 
the industries with the highest concentrations of companies under investigation 
included securities broker-dealers (7.6% of total), software companies (6.4%), and 
electric services (5.9%), with other clustering among national commercial banks 
(4.7%), investment advisors (4.7%), and telecommunications companies (4.7%). The  46 
 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
J
a
n
-
0
2
F
e
b
-
0
2
M
a
r
-
0
2
A
p
r
-
0
2
M
a
y
-
0
2
J
u
n
-
0
2
J
u
l
-
0
2
A
u
g
-
0
2
S
e
p
-
0
2
O
c
t
-
0
2
N
o
v
-
0
2
D
e
c
-
0
2
J
a
n
-
0
3
F
e
b
-
0
3
M
a
r
-
0
3
A
p
r
-
0
3
M
a
y
-
0
3
J
u
n
-
0
3
J
u
l
-
0
3
A
u
g
-
0
3
S
e
p
-
0
3
O
c
t
-
0
3
N
o
v
-
0
3
D
e
c
-
0
3
J
a
n
-
0
4
F
e
b
-
0
4
M
a
r
-
0
4
A
p
r
-
0
4
M
a
y
-
0
4
J
u
n
-
0
4
J
u
l
-
0
4
Time
#
 
o
f
 
I
n
v
e
s
t
i
g
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
S
t
a
r
t
e
d
 
Figure 5.1: Number of Investigations by Starting Date, January 2002- July 2004  
 
other investigations were distributed relatively evenly throughout the remaining 80 
industries. 
  Table 5.1 lists the types of activities on which these investigations focused. 
The most common focus of investigations was accounting fraud. Accounting frauds 
come in various guises, but all have in common a misrepresentation of the company’s 
actual financial position on the financial statements. Examples include straightforward 
ones, such as improperly booking expenses and reporting income before it has been 
collected, as well as the more complicated activities of Enron, such as round-tripping, 47 
 
the latter of which was also used by telecommunications companies trading high-
capacity bandwidth.
30 Overall, a diverse group of companies in 49 industries and 26 
sectors were investigated for accounting fraud during this time. The highest 
concentration was among companies selling prepackaged software, which accounted 
for 14% of the 72 companies investigated for accounting fraud.  
 
Table 5.1: Types of Major Investigations, January 2002-July 2004 
 
Alleged Activity    Number of Companies   % of All  Investigations  
Accounting  Fraud    72         40 
Investment Advice Fraud    36            20 
Securities fraud/mail fraud    21            12 
Energy markets manipulation    17            10 
Insider  trading    7          4 
Tax  fraud/evasion    7          4 
Auditor  Conflict    5          3 
Other    14         8 
Total    179                   100 
 
  The next most common focus of investigations included those related to 
investment banks, securities broker-dealers, and investment advisors. The types of 
activities investigated included providing misleading or fraudulent investment advice; 
broker-dealers and underwriters profiteering off of IPOs by charging excessive 
brokerage fees or receiving illegal payments for allowing access to IPOs; and  
involvement in the creation of Enron’s sophisticated accounting schemes. Another set 
of investigations focused on conflicts of interest within financial conglomerates like 
Citigroup, Merrill Lynch, and JP Morgan. An example of such a conflict is a 
commercial lending division placing pressure on the investment divisions to push the 
stock of a banking client. These conflicts were new targets of investigations because 
these financial conglomerates themselves were new organizational forms that only 
                                                 
30 For an overview of these schemes, see Drutman and Cray (2002).  48 
 
emerged in the wake of Congress repealing the Glass-Steagal Act in 1999. The third 
most frequent type of activity investigated in the post Enron period (10% of 
investigations) related to the manipulation of energy markets. The remaining 
significant investigations involved a number of familiar offenses, such as insider 
trading, tax evasion, tax fraud, embezzlement, money laundering, misleading investor 
information, and bribes of foreign officials. Finally, although only a small number of 
companies were involved, an issue that became the subject of  high profile 
investigations were those involving conflicts of interest between auditors and their 
clients, with Arthur Andersen as the high-profile example.   
  This brief review of the evidence on formal investigations reveals that the 
Enron scandal both occurred within a broader context of ongoing investigations and 
fundamentally reshaped this context by motivating new investigations and expanding 
their scope. These investigations represented a threat to the regulative legitimacy of 
the companies that were targets. As discussed in the preceding section, the adoption of 
SOE was a way that an organization could signal its legitimacy within an emerging set 
of post-Enron norms and, therefore, defend against legitimacy challenges. For 
example, on July 30, 2002, Computer Associates, a software firm based in New York, 
announced that it would adopt stock option expensing. In a statement to the press, 
Sanjay Kumar, the president, explained that the decision was part of an “ongoing 
commitment to adhere to the best practices in everything we do.”
31 At the time, the 
company was under investigation for accounting fraud by the Department of Justice. 
Similarly, in the beginning of August 2002, Citigroup, which was at the center of 
investigations by the SEC and Congress into a number of fraudulent activities relating 
to Enron, adopted SOE. Sanford Weill, CEO of Citigroup, explained that “Citigroup 
                                                 
31 “Computer Associates to Record Worker Stock Options as Expenses,” Wall Street Journal, July 30, 
2002.  49 
 
has always strived to be at the forefront of industry change.”
32  Bank of America, 
another large commercial bank that came under investigation by the SEC in February 
2002, adopted SOE in 2002. In discussing their adoption, the CEO explained that 
“Bank of America is dedicated to the highest level of corporate accountability.”
33 
These three examples reveal that companies that were under investigation and adopted 
SOE used the adoption as an opportunity to present themselves as virtuous and to 
defend their legitimacy. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Organizations that were under direct investigation were more 
likely to adopt SOE. 
Furthermore, organizations linked to those under direct investigations may 
have perceived these investigations as a current or future threat to their own 
legitimacy. Suchman (1995: 597) notes that “legitimation crises tend to become self-
reinforcing feedback loops, as social networks recoil to avoid guilt by association.” 
Although Suchman is referring to the negative impacts of this association for the 
organization facing the legitimacy challenge, he articulates the possibility that 
organizations related to an organization facing a threat to legitimacy might also feel 
threatened. In addition, a vast literature in institutional theory has examined how 
organizations in similar industries tend to become more like one another (DiMaggio 
and Powell 1983, Haunschild & Miner 1997, Haveman 1993). In the same way, 
organizations may also perceive that challenges to the organizational legitimacy of 
their industry peers as challenges to their own legitimacy. Therefore:  
Hypothesis 2: The more industry peers of an organization that were under 
investigation, the more likely it was to adopt SOE. 
                                                 
32 “Citi Claims Major Reforms in Corporate Governance,” American Banker, August 8, 2002.  
33 “Charlotte, N.C.-Based Bank of America Says it Will Report Impact of Options,” Charlotte 
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In addition, the evidence from the data about investigations reveals that the industries 
with the highest incidences of investigations included telecommunications, electric 
services, broker-dealers, commercial banks, investment advisors and software firms. 
Hence:  
Hypothesis 3: Telecommunications companies were more likely to adopt SOE.  
Hypothesis 4 Electric services companies were more likely to adopt SOE.  
Hypothesis 5: Securities broker-dealers were more likely to adopt SOE.  
Hypothesis 6: Commercial banks were more likely to adopt SOE.  
Hypothesis 7: Software companies were more likely to adopt SOE.
34  
  The scandals also generated a great deal of media publicity, and the work of 
Abrahamson (1997), Guillen (1994), Hirsch (1986), and Ruef (1999) has demonstrated 
that the media is an important field-level actor shaping perceptions of organizations, 
organizational phenomenon, and broader institutional logics. In the case of 
investigations, if a company comes under investigation and its stakeholders know 
nothing about it, this may not constitute a threat to legitimacy. However, if a company 
receives a large amount of media attention over investigations or deviant behavior, the 
challenge to legitimacy may be stronger. For example, the American Banker noted that 
Citibank’s decision to adopt SOE occurred right after the company “faced a barrage of 
bad press” about its activities relating to Enron.
35 However, organizations not under 
investigation may still face media scrutiny regarding certain types of activities, and 
this scrutiny represents a challenge to legitimacy. Media scrutiny of deviant behavior, 
whether the focus of investigations or not, represented challenges to both regulative 
and normative legitimacy since it focused attention on organizations not obeying 
specific laws or not acting within accepted norms. Therefore:  
                                                 
34 I did not include a hypothesis about investment advisors, another industry with heavy investigative 
activity, because my sample did not contain any companies in this industry.  
35 L. Moyer, “Citi Claims Major Reforms in Corporate Governance,” American Banke,. August 8, 2002.  51 
 
Hypothesis 8: The more negative media scrutiny faced by a company 
regarding  fraud, scandals, investigations or related deviant behavior, the 
more likely it was to adopt SOE. 
 
Hypotheses: Shareholder Activism 
In addition to the challenges to organizational legitimacy expressed through 
investigations and media scrutiny, shareholder activists also posed challenges to the 
normative legitimacy of specific organizations. These challenge were expressed 
through actions and resolutions that demanded that organizations make specific 
changes to bring their activities in line with what shareholders perceived to be norms 
regarding corporate governance, executive compensation, and social responsibility. 
The surge of shareholder activism in the post-Enron world extended out of the 
shareholder activism movement that had begun in the late 1980s, when institutional 
investors and individual shareholders began to acquire a more active role in corporate 
governance (Davis and Thompson 1994, Monks and Minow 2003). In this new role, 
shareholders attempted to shape corporate decision-making through the submission of 
shareholder resolutions and publicity campaigns, and by engaging in private 
negotiation with corporate management. Shareholder activists have included a diverse 
group of individual shareholders (a.k.a. “gadflies”) and institutional shareholders such 
as public employee pension funds, labor union pension funds, mutual funds, religious 
organizations, and economic and social justice groups.  
  In the decade before the scandals, activists had made significant progress in 
getting corporations to make changes on specific issues. Shareholders also pushed for 
an expansion of the legal framework that defined the range of issues and the ways in 
which shareholders could be involved in governance. For example, shareholder 
activists were instrumental in pushing the SEC to change rules in 1992 that reduced 52 
 
barriers to communication between shareholders and opened up the space for 
shareholder groups to submit resolutions relating to a number of issues that were 
previously closed off to shareholders, such as executive compensation. Despite these 
gains, the legal framework continued to constrain the ability of shareholders to 
influence organizational behavior (Carberry 1996).  
  The severity, scale, and arrogance of the corporate scandals of 2001 and 2002 
mobilized a collective wave of shareholder activism that pressed for changes relating 
to both the issues at the core of the scandals and to some of the historically contentious 
shareholder issues noted above. The scandals motivated institutional shareholders, 
from large pension funds like Calpers and TIAA-CREF, union pension funds, mutual 
funds, religious groups, and individual investors, to push for a variety of changes.
36 
This activism did not manifest itself fully until the proxy season of 2003 because the 
rules governing the submission of shareholder resolutions requires that they be 
submitted many months ahead of corporate annual meetings. These deadlines for the 
2002 proxy season had mostly passed before the full scope of the scandals was 
exposed in the first half of 2002.  
  The 2003 and 2004 proxy seasons saw a 56% and 52% increase, respectively, 
in the number of shareholder proposals that came up for a vote, as compared to 2002.
37 
Labor union pension funds were the most active in terms of shareholder resolutions: 
these funds submitted 48% of all resolutions in 2003 and 44% in 2004, both up 
significantly from 27% in 2002. The United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of 
America (UBCJA) submitted the most resolutions in both 2003 and 2004. The 
percentage of all resolutions submitted by public pension funds, such as Calpers, was 
                                                 
36 Q.S. Kim, “Corporate Gadflies Are the Buzz; Shareholder Activists Sting Company Boards in Proxy Wars,” 
Wall Street Journal, June 10, 2004.  
37 Statistics on shareholder resolutions in this section are from Georgeson Shareholder’s Annual 
Corporate Governance Review 2002, 2003, and 2004, and C. Deutsch, “Revolt of the Shareholders,” 
New York Times, February 1, 2003.  53 
 
low in 2002 (6%) and dropped slightly to 2% in 2003 and 3% in 2004. This relatively 
low percentage of resolutions submitted by these powerful shareholder groups may not 
be a true indicator of the activism and influence of these funds, which have made 
significant use of other tactics, such as private negotiations. (Carleton et al. 1996) 
Individual shareholders accounted for 60% of all resolutions in 2002, 43% in 2003, 
and 46% in 2004. Overall, the percentage of all resolutions that received majority 
votes remained roughly constant between 2002 and 2003.  
  In terms of resolutions aimed at reforming executive compensation or stock 
options,
38 the number increased dramatically from 26 (10% of all resolutions) in 2002 
to 104 (24%) in 2003, and 120 (29%) in 2004. While unions submitted 21% of these 
resolutions in 2002 ( the same amount as pension funds), they submitted 70% in 2003 
(vs. 2% of pension funds) and 60% in 2004 (vs. 2% for pension funds). Individual 
shareholders submitted 52%, 21%, and 35% of all resolutions aimed at reforming 
executive compensation in 2002, 2003, and 2004, respectively. Resolutions that called 
on a company to adopt SOE became allowable under SEC rules in the 2003 proxy 
season. Prior to this ruling, some of the largest and most influential institutional 
investors, such as the Council of Institutional Investors and TIAA-CREF, had already 
come out in favor of expensing. Calpers never endorsed expensing, despite its staff 
urging the group to formally do so.
39 In the 2003 proxy season, shareholder groups 
submitted resolutions demanding the adoption of SOE in 67 companies. Labor union 
pension funds submitted 95% of these resolutions (the remainder were submitted by 
individuals). The UBCJA submitted 40% of all SOE resolutions. In 2004, the number 
                                                 
38 The shareholder resolutions that I group here as related to executive compensation or stock options 
included in 2002:  disclose executive compensation, freeze executive pay during downsizing, no 
repricing of underwater options, establish a performance-based compensation system, restrict executive 
compensation, and vote on all stock-based compensation. In 2003, this list included all of these plus: no 
repricing of stock options, abolish stock options, ask CEO to voluntarily reduce pay, and disclose 
executive compensation.   
39 A. Borrus, “The Campaign to Keep Options off the Ledger,” Business Week, July 15, 2002.  54 
 
of SOE resolutions dropped to 31, with union funds submitting 90% of these. In 2003, 
7 resolutions (40%) for SOE adoption received majority votes in favor, while in 2004, 
20 (65%) received majority votes in favor.   
  Clearly, shareholder activism, as expressed in the number of shareholder 
resolutions that were submitted and went to a vote, significantly increased in 2003 and 
2004. Labor union pension funds and individuals were responsible for the majority of 
all resolutions in 2003 and 2004, while labor unions alone were responsible for a 
sizable majority of the resolutions aimed at reforming executive compensation and 
stock options, including SOE. How might this resurgent shareholder activism in 
general and that which was specifically related to SOE have an impact on SOE 
adoption? The second two waves of SOE adoption (January - May 2003, February - 
May 2004) occurred during two proxy seasons, thus suggesting a possible connection. 
However, in general, shareholder resolutions, even when they receive a majority in 
favor, are not legally binding (although a small percentage are), and in only between 
10% and 30% of cases in which resolutions receive majority support does 
management implement the changes demanded. (Bebchuk and Fried 2004) 
  Although Davis and Thompson (1994: 141) found that shareholder activists 
“increased their influence in corporate governance in the early 1990s,” sociologists of 
organizations and social movements have conducted few empirical investigations of 
the phenomenon of shareholder activism. The post-Enron wave of shareholder 
activism presents a logical research site for examining its influence. In reviewing the 
literature on the effectiveness of shareholder activism, Karpoff (1998) notes that the 
evidence on the impacts of shareholder activism remains ambiguous because studies 
use different sampling frames, shareholder actions, shareholder groups, and use 
different outcomes. However, Karpoff (1998) points to two conclusions that can be 
drawn from the literature. The first is that shareholder activism had been most 55 
 
effective when it is channeled through private negotiation, as opposed to shareholder 
resolutions and proxy fights. The second is that shareholder activism has been the 
most effective when effectiveness is measured as a company making the targeted 
structural change, such as adopting SOE, as imposed to increasing financial 
performance, and that this effectiveness has increased with time. Moreover, in the 
context of the post-scandal environment and the resurgence of shareholder activism, it 
is likely that organizations were more receptive to the demands of shareholders. 
Therefore,  
Hypothesis 9: Organizations that received shareholder resolutions to adopt 
SOE were more likely to adopt SOE. 
The effects of shareholder activism, however, do not only stem form the 
specific reforms that they target. Shareholder resolutions and proxy battles can focus 
negative attention on organizational policies, structures, and procedures (Davis and 
Thompson 1994) that are not in line with the expectations of shareholders. On a 
broader level, therefore, shareholder activism represents a challenge to the normative 
legitimacy of organizations. Similar to other challenges to legitimacy, SOE adoption 
was a way that organizations could defend against challenges expressed through 
shareholder activism. Therefore:  
Hypothesis 10: The more shareholder resolutions a company received, the 
more likely it was to adopt SOE. 
Finally, shareholder activism in the post-Enron era was directed at some of the issues 
connected to the scandals, in particular executive compensation and stock option 
practices. Resolutions that called on companies to restructure these practices 
challenged normative organizational legitimacy and, therefore, may have led these 
organizations to engage in legitimacy defense through SOE adoption. Hence: 56 
 
Hypothesis 11: Organizations that received shareholder resolutions to reform  
executive compensation or stock option practices (not including SOE),were 
more likely to adopt SOE. 
 
Other Hypotheses 
The preceding hypotheses have specified the primary challenges to organizational 
legitimacy that emerged in the post-Enron era. The fundamental claim underlying all 
of these hypotheses is that organizations that were experiencing threats to their 
legitimacy were more likely to adopt SOE. Before moving on to the analysis that 
tested these hypotheses, it is important to note three other possible influences on SOE 
adoption: prior adoption activity, organizational prestige, and the magnitude of the 
potential stock option expense.  
  One of the central insights of the literature on the diffusion of organizational 
innovations is that as more organizations adopt a practice, the practice becomes more 
legitimate, and the adoption rate increases, up to a certain level (e.g., Burns and 
Wholey 1993, Fligstein 1985, Haveman 1993). However, such contagion effects, 
which have been primarily examined as they flow through social structure, are not 
straightforward, but mediated through processes of interpretation and theorization that 
influence the “cultural status of the diffusing item” (Strang and Soule 1998: 276). 
Hence, diffusion rates may not automatically increase as more organizations adopt. As 
the earlier discussion revealed, such processes of interpretation were clearly 
influencing the status of SOE and most likely influenced adoption patterns. More 
specifically, the evidence discussed above regarding the volume and tone of press 
statements around SOE adoption suggests that as more companies adopted, the 
significance of SOE as a symbol of normative legitimacy became diluted because 57 
 
organizations could not present themselves as unique upholders of the new normative 
order. Hence:  
Hypothesis 12: As the total number of companies adopting SOE  increased, the 
adoption rate decreased.  
 Organizational  prestige  has  been used as a variable in analyses of diffusion 
processes (Haveman 1993, Still and Strang 2005) as well as studies of market 
dynamics and competition (Benjamin and Podolny 1999, Podolny 1994). In their 
analysis of SOE adoption, Seethamraju and Zach (2004) found that organizations with 
a higher level of publicity, which can function as a measure of status (Still and Strang 
2005), would be more likely to adopt SOE. The authors suggest that this indicates that 
organizations with more visibility believed that they would benefit more from 
symbolic adoption because the adoption would receive more positive attention. While 
this is certainly possible, higher status organizations might also be more likely to 
adopt SOE in order to defend their legitimacy. These organizations may have felt a 
threat to their own legitimacy in the face of the broader challenges to the legitimacy of 
the core institutions governing corporate behavior that emerged at this time. Hence: 
Hypothesis 13: Higher prestige organizations were more likely to adopt SOE.  
  In addition to organizational status, the magnitude of the potential stock option 
expense may have influenced SOE adoption. A straightforward economic argument 
would predict that companies with large potential stock option expenses would be less 
inclined to adopt SOE because the financial hit would be substantial. Similarly, those 
with a smaller potential expense from employee stock options, would be in a better 
financial position to adopt SOE. Therefore:  
Hypothesis 14: The larger the potential expense from adopting SOE, the less 
likely a company was to adopt SOE.  58 
 
This section has provided a detailed description of the broader institutional context in 
which SOE adoption occurred and developed specific hypotheses relating to how this 
context may have shaped SOE adoption. This paper now turns to the testing of these 
hypotheses.  
 
Sample 
To test these hypotheses, I analyzed the determinants of SOE adoption among the 
Fortune 500, as published by Fortune magazine in April 2002. A total of 27 
organizations were dropped from the sample because they were not at risk of adopting 
SOE during the observation period. This included companies that had already adopted 
SOE, privately held companies that do not file audited financial statements with the 
SEC, and other companies whose stock plans were designed in ways as to make SOE 
adoption irrelevant. The final sample included 473 companies, of which nine became 
right-censored at various points during the observation period because of bankruptcy, 
merger, or acquisition.  
 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is the probability that a company adopted stock option 
expensing, or more specifically, the hazard rate of the event of adoption. Adoption 
was measured as the announcement by an organization of its intention to recognize an 
expense in their financial statements for employee stock options, according to the 
procedures detailed in Financial Accounting Statement 123. Data on SOE adoptions 
were collected from a publicly available list compiled by Bear Stearns, which dated 
adoption by examining corporate press releases and media reports. (Bear Stearns 
2004) 
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Independent Variables 
Investigations: I created a binary variable coded as 1 if an organization was under 
investigation by a federal agency. This variable was measured as a time-varying 
covariate that changed from 0 to 1 during the month that the organization first came 
under investigation. Data on investigations was gathered from publicly available 
information of regulatory agencies. Since the number of companies under any type of 
investigation is extremely large due to a high number of minor infractions, I used two 
sources to focus the data collection on the most significant cases: the SEC’s Annual 
Reports from 2001 to 2003, which list “significant enforcement actions,” and reports 
to the President made by the Corporate Fraud Task Force (CFTF), which were 
published in July 2003 and July 2004. To date the timing of these investigations, I 
supplemented the information in these sources with media reports.  
 
Industry Level Investigations: I measured investigations at the industry level in two 
ways. First, I created an ordinal variable equal to the number of an organization’s 
industry peers that were under investigation, based on four digit SIC code. This 
variable was measured as a time-varying covariate that changed from 0 to the number 
of industry peers under investigation at the time that the first industry peer came under 
investigation. I created a second set of variables to identify the industries that had the 
highest number of companies to come under investigation between January 2002 and 
July 2004: telecommunications, electric services, commercial banks, securities broker-
dealers, and prepackaged software. I created a dummy variable for each of these five 
industries, with each equal to 1 if the company was in the particular industry and 0 if 
not. The sixth variable was coded as 1 if a company was in any other industry and 0 
otherwise.  
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Negative Media Scrutiny: Using the ABI Inform database, I measured negative media 
scrutiny by counting the number of articles that contained, in the title or abstract, the 
company name and any of the following words: investigation, scandal, fraud, 
litigation, corruption, insider trading, or white collar crime. I measured the level of 
media scrutiny during five periods of time: 2001, January – June 2002; July – 
December 2002; January – June 2003; July – December 2003. For each spell, negative 
media scrutiny was measured by using the period that ended closest to the spell’s 
starting time. For example, for a spell that began in September 2002, negative media 
scrutiny was measured from January – June 2002. For a spell that began in June 2003, 
negative media scrutiny was measured from July – December 2002. I used this 
strategy rather than a time constant, one year lag because media coverage of the 
scandals began at the end of 2001 and continued through the entire observation period. 
Measuring negative media scrutiny by only using 2001 would not have captured the 
majority of media coverage relating to the scandals and investigations.  
 
Organizational Prestige: I measured organizational prestige using Fortune magazine’s 
annual ranking of corporate reputations in its “Index of Most Admired Companies” 
(Still and Strang 2005). Fortune uses an interval scale to rate each company in its list, 
and I used the logged ratings for 2001.  
 
Shareholder Activism: I measured shareholder activism using three variables. The first  
was an ordinal variable that counted all shareholder resolutions submitted to the  
company during the previous proxy season. Since proxy seasons are annual, the effect 
of this variable was constant for spells that began during the 12 month period after the  
company’s proxy statement was submitted to the SEC. For example, if shareholders of  
Company A submitted 5 shareholder resolutions to the SEC in March 2002, this  61 
 
variable was measured as 5 for all spells that began between April 2002 and March  
2003. If shareholders of Company A submitted 10 shareholder resolutions in March  
2003, this variable equaled 10 for all spells that started between April 2003 and March  
2004. If shareholders of Company A submitted 0 resolutions in March 2003, the effect  
was 0 for all spells that began between April 2002 and March 2004.  
  The second and third variables that tracked shareholder activism were 
measured in the same way. The former measured all resolutions submitted relating to 
the reform of executive compensation, including resolutions relating to stock options. 
This excluded resolutions calling for the specific adoption of SOE. The final 
shareholder activism variable was a binary variable that measured whether or not 
shareholders had submitted a resolution calling on a company to adopt SOE. Such 
resolutions were only possible after November 2002.   
 
Prior Adoption Activity (Contagion): I measured prior adoption activity within the 
sample by counting the cumulative number of organizations that had adopted SOE 
from the beginning of the observation period up to and including the month prior to 
the beginning of each spell.  
 
Control Variables: I included four control variables: revenues (log), net income, 
number of employees, and option expense as a percentage of net income. I used option 
expense as a percentage of net income in order to standardize the impact of the option 
expense across all companies. These were all measured as constants and collected 
from 2001 corporate annual reports.  
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Analysis 
I used event history analysis to model the effects of the independent variables on the 
instantaneous hazard rate of a company adopting SOE. I measured the time of SOE 
adoption by month, with the observation period beginning in January 2002 and ending 
in July 2004. To incorporate the effects of the time-varying covariates into the models, 
I employed the method of episode splitting (Blossfeld and Rohwer 2002), with all 
relevant changes in the covariates measured by month. After all splits were complete, 
the final dataset consisted of 9,368 total spells, with 123 events occurring during the 
observation period and 350 right-censored cases. 
  Although the Cox model is appropriate for estimating the effects of 
independent variables on the hazard rate (Allison 1984, Blossfeld and Rowher 2002), 
it is not able to capture any form of time-dependence since it effectively “controls for” 
time-dependence. Therefore, the Cox model was not appropriate for measuring the 
effect of previous adoption activity through time or for providing unbiased estimates 
of shareholder activism as expressed in resolutions calling for companies to adopt 
SOE, something that was only possible after November 2002. Hence, a model was 
needed to capture at least some of these time effects, if not formally model time 
dependence. As Figure 5.2 indicates, however, the empirical hazard rate does not 
conform to any of the common parametric models such as the Gompertz, Weibull, log-
normal, or log-logistic. 
  I therefore used a piecewise exponential model, which allows the observation 
period to be divided into different time periods, assumes a constant baseline hazard 
rate during each time period, and allows the effects of the covariates to vary between 
time periods. (Blossfeld and Rohwer 2002).  This model takes the form: 
log rjkp  = x (t) βjkp  63 
 
where r represents the transition rate from state j to state k during time period p, x(t) is 
a vector of covariates,  β is a vector of coefficients associated with the covariates 
during time period p. 
  The empirical hazard rate (Figure 5.2) reveals two distinct periods of SOE 
adoption activity: an initial increase through August 2002, followed by a sharp decline 
and then modest fluctuation. These two periods reflect changes, discussed earlier, in 
both the expectations about regulatory forces imposing mandatory stock option 
expensing, and the volume and tone of corporate press releases about SOE adoption.   
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Figure 5.2: Empirical Hazard Rate of SOE Adoption, January 2002 – July 2004 64 
 
These changes suggest that a shift occurred around this time in the way in which SOE 
was perceived and used as a symbol of normative legitimacy. As a consequence, there 
may have also been a shift in the strength of the forces driving SOE adoption at this  
time. I therefore divided the time axis into two periods, January 2002 – August 2002 
and September 2002 – July 2004, and allowed the effects of the covariates to differ 
between these two time periods.  
 
Results and Discussion 
Table 5.2 provides descriptive statistics, and Table 5.3 provides the correlation matrix. 
(Additional descriptive information is presented in Appendices 1 – 4, including a list 
of the Fortune 500 adopters,  non-Fortune 500 adopters, all companies in the sample,  
 
Table 5.2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable  MEAN     SD        MIN           MAX 
# of Investigations in Industry  1.34    2.73      0      13 
Fortune’s Most Admired Rating  3.67    3.16      0      8.6 
Negative Media Scrutiny  11.63   84.97      0     3113 
# of All Shareholder Resolutions  .387   .851      0            8 
# of Shareholder Resolutions: 
Executive Compensation Reform  .077   .281      0       2 
Revenues ($ millions)  13539.88  18442.31  3042.5  219812 
Net Income ($ millions)  496.33  5457.97  -56121.9  87760 
Stock Option Expense/ 
Net Income (%)  .333  2.79  0  84.46 
Employees (thousands)  46248.08  66828.84  199             13830000 
 
Other Variables     N 
Companies Under Investigation    58 
Companies with at Least One Industry Peer Under Investigation    198 
Companies on Fortune’s Most Admired List    280 
# of Shareholder Resolutions-Stock Option Expensing, 2003    45 
# of Shareholder Resolutions-Stock Option Expensing, 2004    17 
# of Passed Shareholder Resolutions-Stock Option Expensing, 2003    23 
# of Passed Shareholder Resolutions-Stock Option Expensing, 2004  13 65 
 
Table 5.3: Correlation Matrix 
    
      1    2     3       4        5           6      7        
1      Investigation   1                  
2   Industry Investigations    0.23   1                  
3   Negative Media Scrutiny    0.22   0.08      1                
4   # of All Shareholder Resolutions  0.18   0.02    0.02     1              
5   # of Shareholder Resolutions: 
     Executive Compensation    0.13   0.08   -0.00    0.20     1           
6   Shareholder Resolution: 
     Adopt SOE    0.01   0.03   -0.01    0.12    0.27     1          
7   Fortunes Most Admired    0.11   -0.04    0.09    0.20    0.12    0.10     1        
8   Revenues (log)    0.31   0.17     0.21    0.36    0.16    0.07     0.41        
9   Net Income    0.03   0.01     0.01    0.03   -0.01    0.01     0.03        
10  Option Expense/Net Income       -0.02   -0.03   -0.00   0.04     0.02    0.02     0.04   
11  # of Employees    0.06  -0.06    0.36    0.29    0.08    0.07     0.29   
 
     8      9    10    11 
8   Revenues (log)    1 
9   Net Income    0.08     1 
10  Option Expense/Net Income      0.01     -0.01    1 
11  # of Employees          0.54     0.06    0.02       1 
 
and industry breakdowns of Fortune 500 adopters.) Table 5.4 shows results from two  
different piecewise event history models that differ only in how they measure the  
legitimacy challenge posed by investigations at the industry level. Model 1 measures 
the total number of companies in each organization’s industry that were under 
investigation, while model 2 measures the effect of industry-level investigations by 
using dummy variables for each of the five industries that were under the most 
intensive investigative activity: telecommunications, electric services, commercial  
banks, broker dealers, and software. I included model 2 to provide a more detailed 
picture of the effect of investigations at the industry level.  
  The results from the event history models indicate that investigation activity at 
the industry level had a significant effect on SOE adoption, particularly between 
September 2002 and July 2004, thus providing strong support for hypotheses two,  66 
 
Table 5.4: Event History Models 
Voluntary Adoption of Stock Option Expensing
40 
Period 1: January 02 – August 02 
 
   Model 1       Model 2 
Constant  -7.3030****       -8.189**** 
   (1.89)      (1.97) 
Investigation    .5172             -   
   (.419)             - 
# of Investigations Industry    .0668            - 
   (.042)          - 
Telecommunications        -                   -12.983 
        -       (49.19) 
Electric Services        -       -.8616 
        -        (1.02) 
Commercial Banks        -        1.335**** 
        -        (.828) 
Broker Dealers        -        .4797 
        -        (1.05) 
Software        -        1.174 
        -     (1.10) 
Negative Media Scrutiny (log)   .1547     .1766 
 (.134)      (.141) 
# of All Shareholder Resolutions   .0457     .0587 
 (.130)      (.131) 
# of Shareholder Resolutions: Executive Compensation  .5367     .7910 
 (.760)      (.757) 
Fortune’s Most Admired                                                    -.2687    - .340*  
 (.185)      (.189) 
Revenues (log)  .2938     .4035* 
 (.218)      (.230) 
Net Income  .0001     .0000 
 (.000)      (.000) 
Option Expense (as % of net income)  .0315**     .0317** 
 (.013)      (.013) 
Employees   .0000     .0000 
 (.000)      (.000) 
 
 
 
                                                 
40 Standard errors in parentheses. * p ≤. .10, ** p ≤. .05, *** p ≤. .01 , ****  p ≤. .001 
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Table 5.4 (Continued) 
Period 2:  September 2002 – July 2004 
 
                           Model 1          Model 2 
Constant                                                                                -5.295****   -5.502**** 
     (1.74)    (1.76) 
Investigation    -.0368            -  
     (.390)            -     
# of Investigations Industry     .1093****           - 
    (.033)                   - 
Industry: Telecommunications      -     1.315*** 
     (.520) 
Industry: Electric Services      -     .9425** 
     (.420) 
Industry: Commercial Banks       -    .8282 
     (.601) 
Industry: Broker Dealers      -    1.714*** 
     (.693) 
Industry: Software      -    .9956   
     (1.05) 
Negative Media Scrutiny (log)  .1394    .1171 
   (.105)        (.107) 
# of All Shareholder Resolutions  .1223    .1260 
   (.126)    (.129) 
# of Shareholder Resolutions: Executive Compensation   -.5813    -.5868 
   (.526)    (.535) 
Shareholder Resolution to Adopt SOE  -.2060       -.1688 
   (.622)    (.628) 
# of Previous Adopters  -.0148****       -.0145**** 
   (.004)    (.004) 
Fortune’s Most Admired  .0089       -.0125 
   (.147)    (.151) 
Revenues (log)   .2938    .1807 
   (.218)    (.207) 
Net Income   .0000    .0000 
   (.000)    (.000) 
Option Expense (as % of net income)  -.4473                -.5428   
   (.370)    (.415) 
Employees    .0000    .0000 
   (.000)    (.000) 
 
Log Likelihood                                                                -347.898          -340.820 
Degrees of Freedom   23     29 
Number of observations  9368    9368 
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three, four, five, and six. Organizations in four of the five industries that were under 
the most intensive levels of investigation were more likely to adopt SOE: commercial 
banks, telecommunications, electric services, and securities broker-dealers. 
Commercial banks, broker-dealers, and electric services were all implicated, in 
different ways, with the highest profile scandal, Enron. The telecommunications 
industry was the focus of another high-profile scandal, WorldCom. In contrast, the 
software industry experienced a high number of investigations, but the results indicate 
that software companies were not more likely to adopt SOE. Investigations in this 
industry were not driven by a high profile scandal such as Enron or WorldCom.  
  The results do not provide support for hypothesis one, that organizations under 
direct investigation were more likely to adopt SOE. It appears that a direct 
investigation in and of itself was either not a strong enough threat to legitimacy or was 
not a threat against which organizations believed SOE adoption would be an effective 
defense. The results suggest, therefore, that it was not investigations per se that 
influenced SOE adoption, but rather, the strength of the investigative activity at the 
industry level that increased the likelihood of  SOE adoption. This suggests that 
investigations did not translate into a threat to organizational legitimacy until they 
reached a certain intensity at the industry level. Although the results do not provide 
support for hypothesis 8 that companies that were under more intensive negative 
media scrutiny were more likely to adopt SOE, I did not measure this effect at the 
industry level.  
  The results from the event history models also indicate that the effect of 
industry level investigations was strongest in the second time period, i.e., after August 
2002, but there was an effect in both time periods. Although model 1 does not show an 
effect in July and August 2002, model 2 shows that during this period, commercial 
banks, an industry under intensive investigative scrutiny, were more likely to adopt 69 
 
SOE. Model 1 shows that between September 2002 and July 2004, companies in 
industries with high levels of investigative activity were more likely to adopt SOE. 
Model 2 provides more detail about which industries accounted for this effect: 
telecommunications companies, electric service companies, and securities broker-
dealers. The finding that the effect of industry-level investigations was more 
pronounced after August 2002 may seem contradictory in light of the claim that the 
significance of SOE as a symbol of normative legitimacy began to decline after 
August 2002. However, the finding may in fact be consonant with the changing 
significance of SOE as symbol of normative legitimacy over time and may also reveal 
variation in how different companies viewed the practice’s significance. This is worth 
investigating in a little more detail.  
  Among all Fortune 500 companies, adoption rates were at their highest above 
the average during July and August 2002. The average number of adoptions per month 
was 3.84 over the entire observation period, and there were 12 and 51 adoptions, 
respectively, in July and August 2002. It is reasonable to suggest that this initial spike 
in SOE activity among all companies was linked to the early strength of SOE as a 
symbol of normative legitimacy for all companies.
41 While companies facing a 
legitimacy threat may have had much to gain from adopting SOE and signaling their 
normative legitimacy in both the first and second periods, companies that were not 
under a legitimacy threat may have been more likely to adopt in the initial period than 
in the second period. Hence, the lack of strong industry investigation effects in the 
first period and the presence of strong industry investigation effects in the second 
period suggests that the practice’s significance as a symbol of normative legitimacy 
was only useful, during the second period, for those organizations in industries under 
                                                 
41 When I ran the piecewise event history models without covariates, the constants were -4.300 in the 
first period and -4.813 in the second period, both significant at p < .0001. 70 
 
heavy investigation. For other organizations, the significance of the practice as a 
symbol of normative legitimacy may have diminished sharply after August 2002. This 
suggests that SOE retained its significance as a symbol of normative legitimacy for 
companies in industries under investigation even as FASB was making an attempt to 
make the practice mandatory, a threat that was widely perceived as very credible. 
Hence, the shifting significance of SOE as a symbol of normative legitimacy may 
have been perceived differently by companies under investigative threats and those not 
experiencing them.  
  Furthermore, the results provide strong support for hypothesis 12, that as the 
number of previous adopters increased, the adoption rate dropped. The effect is highly 
significant in both models, but only in the period after August 2002.
42 This provides 
further evidence that the ability of the practice to confer a distinctive normative 
legitimacy may have become diluted over time as more companies adopted. Many of 
the initial adopters of SOE used the language of distinctiveness in explaining their 
recognition and adherence to the new normative environment. As more companies 
adopted, claims about distinctiveness would naturally be less effective. It is important 
to point out, however, that the negative findings regarding a contagion effect may also 
suggest another time-dependent process at work. This finding remains important, 
however, because it shows that the emergence of a credible regulatory threat did not 
increase the chances of SOE adoption, something that would be expected considering 
the coercive effects of regulatory pressures on practice adoption (DiMaggio and 
Powell 1983). 
  It may be difficult, however, to detect dramatic shifts in symbolic meanings 
within the short observation period of this study. It does seem clear that in the 
aftermath of the WorldCom scandal and the intensification of political pressures that 
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followed, SOE acquired status as a symbol of normative legitimacy. The volume and 
content of the press releases, as well as broad perceptions of the inevitability of an 
SOE requirement, suggests the beginning of a shift away from normative legitimacy 
after August 2002, but does not suggest a definitive shift in SOE’s symbolic 
significance to one of regulative legitimacy. It is likely that this shift became more 
definitive after the final requirement was implemented in December 2004. The period 
between the initial emergence of SOE as a symbol of normative legitimacy and 
FASB’s implementation of this requirement, i.e., most of the observation period used 
in this study, was most likely a period of transition in the practice’s symbolic meaning 
with regards to organizational legitimacy. In this interim period, while a requirement 
seemed imminent, it was not a complete certainty, and most companies were probably 
waiting to see if SOE would become a requirement before they adopted. Hence the 
practice, while losing some meaning as a symbol of normative legitimacy, may not 
have acquired significance as a symbol of regulative legitimacy so quickly. Only 
additional research will provide a more definitive insight into this.  
  With respect to shareholder activism, the results provide no support for 
hypotheses 9-11. Although the corporate scandals mobilized intense shareholder 
activism on a range of issues, the results reveal that none of the three shareholder 
activism variables had a significant effect on SOE adoption. This may indicate that the 
power and ability of shareholders to influence organizational behavior remains 
limited. Even in the wake of the scandals, organizations may not have seen 
shareholder activism as a significant threat to organizational legitimacy. Another 
interpretation is that since the majority of these resolutions were submitted by labor 
unions, corporate management may have felt more ambivalent or less serious about a 
legitimacy threat from a group with whom it had been in long-term conflict and whose 
power had been eroding. It is important to note that shareholder resolutions measure 72 
 
only one form of activism. Shareholder groups, and in particular institutional 
investors, also place pressure on boards of directors and management through informal 
meetings and communication, and publicity campaigns. These vehicles often lead to 
negotiation and some capitulation from boards and managers, sometimes precluding 
more formal shareholder activism through proxy fights. This study did not measure the 
impact of informal means of shareholder pressure.  
  The results regarding organizational prestige are interesting. Although 
hypothesis 13, that companies with higher prestige will be more likely to adopt SOE, 
is not supported, model 2 shows that higher prestige companies were actually less 
likely to adopt SOE in the first period. This suggests that, in the post-Enron debates 
and criticism of a variety of corporate practices and institutions, higher prestige 
companies did not believe it was necessary to recognize the new normative 
environment and signal their willingness to conform to it, even symbolically. This 
finding may also suggest that high status companies did not experience the general 
threats to the legitimacy of broader institutional frameworks governing corporate 
behavior more intensely than other companies simply because of their high status 
within this system, nor do they appear to perceive that their prestige would make the 
potential benefits of symbolic SOE adoption more powerful. Alternatively, the 
findings regarding status suggest that high status firms may be more insulated from 
legitimacy threats, similar to the finding by Phillips and Zuckerman (2001) that high 
status companies do not have to worry about gaining legitimacy.  
  Finally, the results provide interesting evidence regarding the influence of the 
magnitude of the potential option expense. The common wisdom is that companies 
with a smaller potential option expense will be more likely to adopt SOE because the 
economic cost of adoption will not be large. Previous literature has revealed that the 
magnitude of the expense had no effect on SOE adoption. (Aboody et al. 2003). The 73 
 
findings from both models above, however, indicate that as the magnitude of the 
option expense increased, so did the likelihood of SOE adoption during July and 
August of 2002. This reveals that SOE adoption was not a simple choice based on a 
cost-benefit analysis of the potential expense. This finding also suggests that the 
symbolic value of SOE adoption may have increased as the magnitude of the potential 
option expense increased.  
  Overall, the findings present a complex picture of symbolic SOE adoption and 
the relative strength of different institutional forces in challenging organizational 
legitimacy. Although investigations were clearly an influence on SOE adoption rates, 
the effect operated primarily at the industry level. Hence, investigations appear to be a 
legitimacy challenge that organizations perceived could be managed by adopting SOE, 
but the effect is not direct. Such challenges were primarily challenges to regulative 
legitimacy because they involved an examination of whether an organization was in 
compliance with formal rules and regulations. In contrast, the legitimacy threats 
embodied in negative media scrutiny and shareholder activism were either not 
powerful enough or were of a type that companies did not perceive that SOE adoption 
would be effective in addressing. Media scrutiny and shareholder activism represented 
challenges to normative legitimacy, but did not illicit a similar response as industry-
level investigations. Hence, organizations may perceive threats to regulative 
legitimacy as more immediate and real than threats to normative legitimacy, and 
respond to them more proactively through symbolic practice adoption.  
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
 
The concept of organizational legitimacy has been a central one to organizational 
sociology. Although we know a great deal about the ways in which new organizations 
and new organizational forms acquire legitimacy, the importance of this legitimacy, 
and the social dynamics of conflict surrounding the creation of the norms and rules 
that confer such legitimacy, our understanding of the strategic action that 
organizations take to maintain their legitimacy over time and to defend their 
legitimacy when it is challenged has been limited. This paper has revealed that when 
organizational legitimacy is challenged, one way in which organizations react is to 
engage in symbolic adoption of practices that are closely connected, ideologically, to 
the sources of the legitimacy challenge. However, symbolic practice adoption does not 
appear to be a standard response to any legitimacy threat. 
   This paper broadens and deepens our understanding of how organizations 
attempt to manage their legitimacy in the face of challenges and threats. The evidence 
presented here provides empirical support for recent theoretical claims that 
organizations engage in symbolic practice adoption in addition to rhetorical strategies 
in the face of legitimacy challenges (Ashforth and Gibbs 1990, Suchman 1995). The 
findings also expand upon the recent work of Elsbach (1994) and Elsbach and Sutton 
(1992) which has examined the ways in which impression management activities are 
closely connected to institutionalized organizational structures in the process of 
legitimacy defense. In addition, this paper has illuminated ways in which the symbolic 
meaning of organizational practices is socially constructed through field-level 
interaction between a diverse group of actors, a process that becomes particularly 
visible during times of institutional destabilization (Fligstein 2001). The results75 
 
provide some support for the contention that the meaning of SOE shifted away from 
being a symbol of normative legitimacy to one of regulative legitimacy, but additional 
research is needed to examine more closely the field-level dynamics that construct 
legitimacy and the symbolic meaning of particular practices, and how organizational 
actors perceive these practices and their relation to organizational legitimacy in 
different settings 
  In terms of some of the central issues of interest to the ongoing project of the 
new institutionalism in organizational analysis, the research presented here confirms 
both the central role of accounting practices in organizational symbolism first 
postulated by Meyer and Rowan (1977) and the utility of examining the adoption of 
accounting practices through an institutional lens (Mezias 1990, 1995). In addition, 
this paper broadens some of the early neoinstitutional approaches to organizational 
analysis (Meyer and Rowan 1977, DiMaggio and Powell 1983) by examining a case in 
which practice adoption was not used a way for organizations to gain legitimacy by 
imitating successful organizations or responding to coercive pressures, but instead, 
was used as a way for organizations to defend their legitimacy by differentiating 
themselves from other organizations, but isomorphic with emerging norms. 
Furthermore, this paper expands upon a well-established stream of institutional 
research regarding early and late practice adopters. The work of Baron et al. (1986), 
Tolbert and Zucker (1983), and Westphal et al. Shortell (1997) has revealed that early 
adopters of a practice do so for economic or technical reasons, while later adopters do 
so to acquire legitimacy once a practice becomes institutionalized This analysis of 
SOE adoption reveals that in certain situations, early adopters may also adopt in order 
to manage their legitimacy.  
  The analysis presented in this paper also has distinct limits. First, the 
observation period is short, and it would be worthwhile in future research to extend 76 
 
this as far as possible past December 2004, when SOE became mandatory. Doing so 
would likely reveal more obvious shifts in the symbolic meaning of SOE and in the 
forces shaping adoption. Second, the sample only included the Fortune 500, the largest 
firms in terms of revenues. The sample excluded a number of organizations that 
adopted SOE and a number of industries in which SOE adoption was prevalent, e.g., 
real estate. Hence, SOE adoption may have been importantly shaped by additional 
factors. On a more general level, the dynamics of legitimacy defense may be very 
different in smaller organizations, and in nonprofit and governmental organizations. 
Third, as noted above, the analysis does not take a detailed view of how field-level 
forces shaped legitimacy challenges and responses in the post-Enron world. Finally, 
although the results presented here suggest that the ability of shareholder activism to 
affect change is limited, shareholder activism is measured only through shareholder 
resolutions. Shareholder groups have also applied political pressure to organizations to 
make changes through less formal methods such as meetings with executives and 
media campaigns, and future research that analytically incorporates these mechanisms 
is needed to examine the conditions under which shareholder activists have power to 
effect change. Organizational sociologists have largely ignored the phenomenon of 
shareholder activism, and it is clearly a phenomenon that requires much more 
intensive research and theoretical expansion. The results presented here take a small 
step in this direction.  
  The findings and analysis presented here illuminate a variety of additional 
research opportunities. Future projects could examine the ways in which symbolic 
practice adoption was connected to impression management techniques in order to 
examine Suchman’s (1995) claim that both are necessary for effective legitimacy 
defense. In addition, it would be useful to understand how SOE adoption was 
connected to broader attempts of organizations to derail efforts to implement 77 
 
legislation that would have substantially altered existing rules of corporate 
governance, auditing, accounting, and executive compensation. Another line of 
research could examine the ways in which legitimacy challenges and defense 
strategies are contingent upon more proximate field-level dynamics. This paper merely 
illuminates industry-level variation in how organizations responded to legitimacy 
challenges. Additional research could provide more detailed analysis of how 
legitimacy threats emerged and were perceived by companies in particular industries, 
as well as how and why different types of organizations reacted to these challenges in 
different ways. In addition, the results suggest that organizational actors may perceive 
challenges to different types of organizational legitimacy as stronger than others and 
more effectively defended against through symbolic practice adoption. Future research 
on the defense of organizational legitimacy that incorporates more sophisticated 
conceptions of organizational legitimacy (Ruef and Scott 1997, Suchman 1995) would 
greatly enhance our understanding of variation in the types of responses to these 
challenges. Finally, it would be useful to conduct a more detailed content analysis of 
the ideological battles that emerged in the media during this period regarding 
institutional change and corporate justifications for stock option expensing. This paper 
only touches upon such an analysis, which could help to make more substantial 
empirical and theoretical connections between discourse, framing processes, and 
social action.   
  On a broader level, this paper has examined the ways in which for-profit 
organizations defended their interests and resisted regulation by the state, professions, 
and civil society after the recent scandals at Enron and other companies. The scandals 
precipitated a general legitimacy crisis of the core institutional framework that defines 
the formal rules and informal expectations about how corporations operate in the 
United States. They also challenged the legitimacy of the ideology of shareholder 78 
 
value that emerged in the 1980s and matured in the 1990s, an ideology that has had 
significant consequences for the ways in which companies are managed and for 
whom, and how they distribute returns on investment to various stakeholders 
(Fligstein 2001, Lowenstein 2004). Furthermore, the scandals brought into question 
the cognitive legitimacy of a regulatory system that provides corporations with a great 
deal of freedom from regulation. The institutional destabilization provoked by the 
scandals opened up broad debate, albeit for a short period, about how corporations are 
regulated and governed, and who is entitled to claims on their productive assets and 
profits. To a great extent, the corporate managers and their advisors who were the 
targets of the investigations, public scrutiny, and political pressures were able to 
effectively prevent the enactment of regulation that was more burdensome than the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Thus, this group of actors was able to preserve the institutional 
framework that provides them with a great deal of power. The success with which the 
largest corporations in the U.S. were able to defend their interests was in large part a 
result of serious political lobbying and the support of people in the highest ranks of the 
federal government, but was also a function of corporations defending the legitimacy 
of the overall system and their own legitimacy as more or less virtuous actors. The 
symbolic adoption of SOE, therefore, can be seen as part of a much broader effort to 
derail debate about the potential implementation of significant changes to the 
institutional conditions that structure and define the dynamics of contemporary 
American capitalism.  
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APPENDIX 1: FORTUNE 500 SOE ADOPTERS 
 
AES 
AIG 
AT&T 
Allegheny Energy 
Allstate 
Amazon.Com 
Ameren 
American Express 
Ashland 
Bank One Corp. 
Bank of America Corp. 
Bank of New York Co. 
Bear Stearns 
BellSouth 
CMS Energy 
CSX 
Calpine 
Capital One Financial 
Cendant 
Centex 
Charter Communications 
Chubb 
Cinergy 
Circuit City Stores 
Citigroup 
Coca-Cola 
Comerica 
Computer Assoc. Intl. 
ConocoPhillips 
Cooper Industries 
Costco Wholesale 
Cummins 
Delphi 
Dole Food 
Dow Chemical 
DuPont 
Dynegy 
Entergy 
Equity Office Properties 
Exxon Mobil 
FMC 
FPL Group 
 
Fannie Mae 
Fidelity National Financial 
Fifth Third Bancorp 
FleetBoston Financial 
Fleming 
Ford Motor 
General Electric 
General Motors 
Genuine Parts 
Georgia-Pacific 
Goldman Sachs Group 
Goodrich 
Hartford Financial Services 
Home Depot 
Hormel Foods 
Host Marriott 
Household International 
InterActiveCorp 
Johnson Controls 
Jones Apparel Group 
KeyCorp 
KeySpan 
Kmart Holding 
Lear 
Leggett & Platt 
Lehman Brothers Holdings 
Lincoln National 
Lowe's 
Lyondell Chemical 
Marathon Oil 
May Dept. Stores 
Mellon Financial Corp. 
Merrill Lynch 
MetLife 
Microsoft 
Morgan Stanley 
National City Corp. 
Northwest Airlines 
Omnicom Group 
PNC Financial Services         
PPG Industries 
PPL 
 
Paccar 
PacifiCare Health  
PepsiCo 
Pinnacle West Capital 
Tremor 
Principal Financial 
Procter & Gamble 
Progressive 
Prudential Financial 
Puget Energy 
Pulte Homes 
Rite Aid 
Rohm & Haas 
SBC Communications 
Safeco 
Saks 
ServiceMaster 
Smithfield Foods 
Smurfit-Stone 
Container 
Sprint 
St. Paul Cos. 
State St. Corp. 
Steel case 
SunTrust Banks 
Sunoco 
Target 
Temple-Inland 
Tenet Healthcare 
Tensor Petroleum 
US Airways Group 
United Parcel Service 
Unocal 
Unum Provident 
Venison 
Communications 
Visitor 
Wachovia Corp. 
Wal-Mart Stores 
Washington Mutual 
Wasco International 
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APPENDIX 2: FORTUNE 500 SOE ADOPTERS BY INDUSTRY 
 
SIC 
Code 
Industry 
 
# of 
Adopters 
 
% of All 
Adopters 
6021  National Commercial Banks  12  9.76 
4911 Electric  Services  9  7.32 
2911  Adhesives and Sealants  7  5.69 
6331  Fire, Marine, and Casualty Insurance  5  4.07 
4813 Telephone  Communications  5  4.07 
6311 Life  Insurance  4  3.25 
6211 Securities  Broker-Dealers  4  3.25 
5331 Variety  Stores  4  3.25 
3711 Automobiles  3  2.44 
2821 Plastic  Materials  3  2.44 
6798  Real Estate Investment Trusts  3  2.44 
6022  State Commercial Banks  3  2.44 
4512 Air  Transport  2  1.63 
3714 Automobile  Parts  2  1.63 
5211  Building Materials Stores  2  1.63 
1531  Construction: Operative Builders  2  1.63 
5311 Department  Stores  2  1.63 
4931  Electric and Other Services  2  1.63 
6411 Insurance  Agents  2  1.63 
2011  Meat Packing Plants  2  1.63 
5013 Natural  Gas  2  1.63 
6141 Personal  Credit  Institutions  2  1.63 
7372 Prepackaged  Software  2  1.63 
2086 Soft  Drinks  2  1.63 
6321  Accident and Health Insurance  1  0.81 
7311 Advertising  Agencies  1  0.81 
0174  Agriculture: Citrus Fruits   1  0.81 
3728 Aircraft  Parts  1  0.81 
6159 Business  Credit  Institutions  1  0.81 
4841 Cable  TV  1  0.81 
5961  Catalog and Mail Order  1  0.81 
2653 Corrugated  Boxes  1  0.81 
4215 Courier  Services  1  0.81 
1311 Crude  Petroleum  Producers  1  0.81 
5912 Drug  Stores  1  0.81 
3641 Electric  Bulbs  1  0.81 
5063 Electrical  Apparatus  1  0.81 
5731 Electronic  Stores  1  0.81 
3519 Engines  1  0.81 
6111  Federal Credit Agencies  1  0.81 
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SIC 
Code  Industry  # of 
Adopters 
% of All 
Adopters 
5141 Grocery  Stores  1  0.81 
6324  Hospital and Medical Services Plans  1  0.81 
3646 Lighting  Fixtures  1  0.81 
8741 Management  Services  1  0.81 
2515  Mattresses and Beds  1  0.81 
8062  Medical and Surgical Hospitals  1  0.81 
4924 Natural  Gas  1  0.81 
2522 Office  Furniture  1  0.81 
1382  Oil and Gas Exploration  1  0.81 
3533 Oil  Field  Machinery  1  0.81 
2851 Paint  1  0.81 
2631 Paperboard  Mils  1  0.81 
2531  Public Building Furniture  1  0.81 
2611 Pulp  Mills  1  0.81 
4011 Railroad  1  0.81 
6531 Real  Estate  Agents  1  0.81 
6036 Savings  Institutions  1  0.81 
2841  Soap and Detergents  1  0.81 
6361 Title  Insurance  1  0.81 
4700 Transportation  1  0.81 
2331  Women's Blouses and Shirts  1  0.81 
Total    123 100 
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APPENDIX 3: ALL FORTUNE 500 COMPANIES IN SAMPLE 
3M 
AES 
AFLAC 
AIG 
AK Steel Holding 
AMR 
AOL Time Warner 
AT&T 
Abbott Laboratories 
Adelphia Communications 
Administaff 
AdvancePCS 
Advanced Micro Devices 
Aetna 
Agilient Technologies 
Air Products & Chem. 
Airborne 
Albertson's 
Alcoa 
Allegheny Energy 
Allied Waste Industries  
Allmerica Financial 
Allstate 
Alltel 
Altria Group  
AmSouth Bancorp. 
Amazon.Com 
Amerada Hess 
Ameren 
American Axle & Mfg. 
American Electric Power 
American Express 
American Financial Group 
American Standard 
AmerisourceBergen 
Ames Dept Stores 
Amgen 
Anadarko Petroleum 
Anheuser-Busch 
Anixter International 
Aon 
Apple Computer 
Applied Materials 
Aramark 
Archer Daniels Midland 
Armstrong Holdings 
Arrow Electronics 
Ashland 
AutoNation 
AutoZone 
ADP 
Avaya 
Avery Dennison  
Avista 
Avnet 
Avon Products 
BB&T Corp. 
BJ's Wholesale Club 
Baker Hughes 
Ball 
Bank One Corp. 
Bank of America 
Bank of New York 
Barnes & Noble 
Baxter International 
Bear Stearns 
Becton Dickinson 
BellSouth 
Best Buy 
Big Lots 
Black & Decker 
Borders Group 
Brink's 
Bristol-Myers Squibb 
Brunswick 
Burlington No. Santa Fe 
Burlington Resources 
Chase Manhattan 
C.H. Robinson 
CDW 
CMS Energy 
CNF 
CSX 
CVS 
Cablevision Systems 
Caesars Entertainment 
Campbell Soup 
Capital One Financial 
Cardinal Health 
Caremark Rx 
Caterpillar 
Cendant 
CenterPoint Energy 
Centex 
Charles Schwab 
Charter Communications 
ChevronTexaco 
Chubb 
Cigna 
Cinergy 
Circuit City Stores 
Cisco Systems 
Citigroup 
Clear Channel 
Communications 
Clorox 
Coca-Cola 
Coca-Cola Enterprises 
Colgate-Palmolive 
Columbia/HCA Healthcare 
Comcast 
Comdisco Holding 
Comerica 
Compaq Computer 
Computer Associates 
Computer Sciences 
ConAgra Foods 
Conectiv 
Conoco 
ConocoPhillips 
Conseco 
Consolidated Edison 
Constellation Energy 
Continental Airlines 
Cooper Industries 
Cooper Tire & Rubber 
Core-Mark International 
Corning 
Costco Wholesale 83 
 
Aquila  Calpine  Countrywide Financial 
Coventry Health Care 
Cox Communications 
Crown Holdings 
Cummins 
D.R. Horton 
DTE Energy 
Dana 
Danaher 
Darden Restaurants 
Dean Foods 
Deere 
Dell 
Delphi 
Delta Air Lines 
Devon Energy 
Dillard's 
Dole Food 
Dollar General 
Dominion Resources 
Dover 
Dow Chemical 
DuPont 
Duke Energy 
Dynegy 
EMC 
Eastman Chemical 
Eastman Kodak 
Eaton 
Echostar Communications 
Edison International 
El Paso 
Equity Office Properties 
Estée Lauder 
Exelon 
Express Scripts 
Exxon Mobil 
FMC 
FPL Group 
Family Dollar Stores 
Fannie Mae 
FedEx 
Federal-Mogul 
Federated Dept. Stores 
Fidelity National  
Fifth Third Bancorp 
First American Corp. 
First Data 
FirstEnergy 
FleetBoston Financial 
Fleming 
Fluor 
Foot Locker 
Ford Motor 
Fortune Brands 
Foster Wheeler 
Gannett 
Gap 
Gateway 
General Dynamics 
General Electric 
General Mills 
General Motors 
Genuine Parts 
Georgia-Pacific 
Gillette 
Golden State Bancorp 
Golden West Financial 
Goldman Sachs Group 
Goodrich 
Goodyear Tire & Rubber 
Group 1 Automotive 
H.J. Heinz 
Halliburton 
Harley-Davidson 
Harrah's Entertainment 
Hartford Financial 
Services 
Health Net 
HealthSouth 
Hershey Foods 
Hewlett-Packard 
Hilton Hotels 
Home Depot 
Honeywell Intl. 
Hormel Foods 
Host Marriott 
Household International 
Humana 
IBM 
ITT Industries 
Idacorp 
Ikon Office Solutions 
Illinois Tool Works 
Ingram Micro 
Intel 
InterActiveCorp 
International Paper 
Interpublic Group 
Interstate Bakeries 
J.C. Penney 
JDS Uniphase 
Jabil Circuit 
Jacobs Engineering Group 
Jefferson-Pilot 
John Hancock Financial 
Services 
Johnson & Johnson 
Johnson Controls 
Jones Apparel Group 
KB Home 
Kellogg 
Kelly Services 
Kerr-McGee 
KeyCorp 
KeySpan 
Kimberly-Clark 
Kindred Healthcare 
Kmart Holding 
Kohl's 
Kroger 
LTV 
Lear 
Leggett & Platt 
Lehman Brothers Holdings 
Lennar 
Lennox International 
Lexmark International 
Limited Brands 
Lincoln National 
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Lockheed Martin   
Loews 
Longs Drug Stores 
Lowe's 
Lucent Technologies 
Lyondell Chemical 
MBNA 
MCI WorldCom 
MGM Mirage 
Manpower 
Marathon Oil 
Marriott International 
Marsh & McLennan 
Masco 
Mattel 
Maxtor 
May Dept. Stores 
Maytag 
McDonald's 
McGraw-Hill 
McKesson 
Medtronic 
Mellon Financial Corp. 
Merck 
Meritor Automotive 
Merrill Lynch 
MetLife 
Micron Technology 
Microsoft 
Mirant 
Mohawk Industries 
Monsanto 
Morgan Stanley 
Motorola 
Murphy Oil 
NCR 
NSTAR 
NTL Europe 
Nash Finch 
National City Corp. 
Nationwide 
Navistar International 
Newell Rubbermaid 
Nextel Communications 
NiSource 
Nike 
Nordstrom 
Norfolk Southern 
NorthWestern 
Northeast Utilities 
Northern Trust Corp. 
Northrop Grumman 
Northwest Airlines 
Nucor 
OGE Energy 
ONEOK 
Occidental Petroleum 
Office Depot 
OfficeMax 
OfficeMax 
Omnicom Group 
Oracle 
Owens & Minor 
Owens Corning 
Owens-Illinois 
Oxford Health Plans 
PG&E Corp. 
PNC Financial Services 
Group 
PPG Industries 
PPL 
Paccar 
PacifiCare Health Sys. 
Parker Hannifin 
Pathmark Stores 
Pepsi Bottling 
PepsiCo 
Performance Food Group 
Pfizer 
Phelps Dodge 
Pinnacle West Capital 
Pitney Bowes 
Praxair 
Premcor 
Procter & Gamble 
Progress Energy 
Progressive 
Providian Financial 
Prudential Financial 
Public Service Enterprise  
Puget Energy 
Pulte Homes 
Quantum 
Quest Diagnostics 
Qwest Communications 
R.R. Donnelley & Sons 
RadioShack 
Raytheon 
Regions Financial 
Reynolds American 
Rite Aid 
Rockwell Automation 
Rohm & Haas 
Roundy's 
Ryder System 
SBC Communications 
SCANA 
SCI Systems 
SPX 
Safeco 
Safeway 
Saks 
Sanmina-SCI 
Sara Lee 
Schering-Plough 
Science Applications Intl. 
Sears Roebuck 
Sempra Energy 
ServiceMaster 
Sherwin-Williams 
ShopKo Stores 
Sierra Pacific Resources 
Smith International 
Smithfield Foods 
Smurfit-Stone Container 
Solectron 
Sonic Automotive 
SouthTrust Corp. 
Southern 
Texas Instruments 
Textron 
Toys `R‘ Us 
W.W. Grainger 
Wachovia Corp. 
Wal-Mart Stores 85 
 
Southwest Airlines 
Spartan Stores 
Sprint 
St. Paul Cos. 
Staff Leasing 
Staples 
Starwood Hotels & Resorts 
State St. Corp. 
Steelcase 
Sun Microsystems 
SunTrust Banks 
Sunoco 
Supervalu 
Sysco 
TJX 
TRW 
TXU 
Target 
Tech Data 
Temple-Inland 
Tenet Healthcare 
Tenneco Automotive 
Tesoro Petroleum 
TransMontaigne 
Tribune 
Tyson Foods 
U.S. Bancorp 
UAL 
US Airways Group 
USA Education 
USG 
Union Pacific 
Union Planters Corp. 
Unisys 
United Auto Group 
United Parcel Service 
United Stationers 
United Technologies 
UnitedHealth Group 
Unocal 
UnumProvident 
VF 
Valero Energy 
Verizon Communications 
Viacom 
Visteon 
Walgreen 
Walt Disney 
Washington Mutual 
Waste Management 
WellPoint Health 
Networks 
Wellpoint 
Wells Fargo 
Wesco International 
Western Gas Resources 
Westvaco 
Weyerhaeuser 
Whirlpool 
Whitman 
Willamette Industries 
Williams 
Wisconsin Energy 
Wyeth 
Xcel Energy 
Xerox 
Yellow Roadway 
York International 
Yum! Brands 
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APPENDIX 4: SOE ADOPTERS AND DATES PRIOR TO JANUARY 2002
43 
 
Alabama National Bancorporation  December 1998 
BASF AG  March 2001 
Boeing Co*  December 1998 
Entropin Inc  December 1999 
Level 3 Communications, Inc  December 1998 
MacDermid Inc  April 2001 
Mercantile Bankshares  December 1995 
Pearson PLC  August 2000 
Protective Life  December 1995 
RCN Corp  December 2000 
Star Scientific Inc  December 1999 
TCF Financial Corp  December 2000 
Winn-Dixie Stores Inc*  December 1996 
 
*Fortune 500 
                                                 
43 Bear Stearns, 2004.   
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